Daily Report

East Europe

FBIS-EEU-94-159
Wednesday
17 August 1994

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Commentary Views Opening of 'Activists' Trial

AU1708084894 Tirana GAZETA SHQIPTARE in Albanian 14 Aug 94 p 1

[Commentary by "p.r.": "Tomorrow the Trial Process Against 'Omonoia' Activists Begins]

[Text] Tirana—Tomorrow, one of the most important trials of the year opens. Six [number as published] activists of "Omonoia," the Greek minority organization in Albania, arrested a few months ago, will face trial on grave charges: high treason toward the fatherland and working for foreign secret intelligence services. All of them face harsh sentences, the death penalty included.

The issue of the six minority defendants, more than the spectacular aspect of the indictment—there have been no trials with such charges for a long time—is important for the impact that it is expected to have on the strained Albanian-Greek relations. For a long time now, this issue has become a matter of harsh accusations and counter-accusations between the diplomats of these two neighboring countries. The Greek diplomats are charging the Albanian authorities with making use of this issue to "scare away" the Greek minority in Albania, forcing them to renounce their efforts to fulfill their requests. The Greek foreign minister, Papulias himself, after a meeting in Athens with "Omonoia's" chairman, Kariazatis, termed their arrest "a farce based on the legal provisions of a penal law used by the Stalinist regime." Papulias added that "the new situation is creating a new climate," stating that the proceedings of this trial could not pass without being immediately reflected in the interstate relations between the two countries.

The Albanian side responded at once, describing the Greek stance as unacceptable and an interference in the affairs of Albanian justice. "It is up to the court to find the defendants guilty or not guilty. The Greek Government is manipulating the Greek minority and "Omonoia" for its own domestic purposes," Albanian Foreign Minister Alfred Sereqi told Greek Ambassador Tsalikis.

The prosecution will be directed by two of the most distinguished prosecutors, Arben Qeleshi and Genc Gjokutaj. They will present the court with proof that, they say, proves the guilt of each of the defendants.

World Media Said Minimizing Plight of Kosovo

AU1508073694 Tirana RILINDJA in Albanian 11 Aug 94 p 2

[Commentary by Binak Kelmendi: "Crossing the 'Red Line' in Kosova"]

[Text] One day after the "courtesy" intervention of NATO aircraft against the Bosnian Serbs around Sarajevo, one could read on the teletext of the French television station TVF1 the following: "Between 28 July and 6 August this year, three (in numerals too: 3) people have been killed in Sarajevo. NATO's attack may pacify the general situation as well as the Bosnian Serbs, who have again refused the Contact Group's peace plan."

After NATO's recent attack, not only were the Serbs not pacified, but Karadzic organized the general mobilization of the Serbian population of Bosnia and called for resistance on the part of the entire people in order to preserve greater Serbia and the union of Bosnia's Serbs with it.

Three days after this "news" on the teletext of French television, one could again read of the situation in Bosnia, about sporadic fighting without casualties, about the situation in Rwanda and Cuba, about the bombardments of the Kurds by the Turks and the Iraqis, about the Middle East peace process... This news is also in the French and Swiss daily press.

This is not the purpose of this article. The purpose of this article is to point out the irony of the news about Albanians, wherever they may be, and its selectiveness. For the past two days, the hunger strike of the former political prisoners and victims of persecution in Albania has also been given "top billing." Euronews has led with reports on the situation of the Albanian strikers. This station has also transmitted film reportage of the strike. There is nothing wrong in this, except that information must be complete, and destructiveness and bias were clearly evident in this case. Despite its good intentions, the case of a report by ORF Austrian Television last Sunday [7 Aug] about the situation in southern Albania was similar. The Austrian reporter gave opportunities to both Albanians and members of the Greek minority to speak. Both sides spoke about and from their own viewpoints. The Greeks complained about violations of their rights, while the Albanians said that the members of the minority had more rights than themselves... On the other hand, Swiss newspapers write about the rare cases in which Albanians are involved in the sale of drugs and mention only in passing or not at all cases in which the Swiss police themselves sell and consume drugs, even in large quantities...

To return to the French television teletext: Between 28 July and 7 August this year, five Albanians were killed in Kosova. Those killed included a five-year-old child. Of the five, only one was armed. He was killed while defending his own home, which was later burned by the Serbian police. There is still no war in Kosova, at any rate not a declared one. Especially not declared by the Albanians. Nevertheless, the Serbian regime murders Albanians at will—Albanians of Kosova and of Albania. Nothing, anywhere, about these murders. The Serbian regime even holds the victims to blame, just as it blames all the Albanians, who, for familiar reasons, have chosen a peaceful path to settling their national question. None of the French media reported these murders of Albanians. No Swiss media mentioned them.

Why is this the case? Is it our own fault? (Propaganda, counter-propaganda, prompt reporting with photographic and filmed evidence, etc.) Or is it a question of the indifference of these media to the situation in Kosova?

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I think that it is first and foremost our own fault. When the murder of two Albanians on the Albanian-Albanian border [i.e. Albanian-Kosova border] was reported, Tirana seemed "pleased" to report that the victims were not citizens of Albania. In Kosova, it was realized very late that these were citizens of Kosova. Otherwise, the political parties of the Albanians in Kosova would have reacted earlier.

We do not know what the Albanian correspondents of world news agencies in Prishtina reported about these murders, just as we do not know how these news agencies subsequently reported them. Albanian radio and television gave them the coverage they deserved. The Republic of Kosova Information Center that operates in Prishtina and Geneva no doubt must have spread that news throughout the world. RILINDJA reported it to the extent permitted by the conditions of BUJKU, which works under occupation in Prishtina.

In a word, the Albanians were informed of these murders. However, either the world public was not informed of these murders, or the world media that deal with these matters were not interested in them. The world is or says it is interested in the conflict in the areas of the former Yugoslavia not spreading to the south of the Balkans. The United States is in the lead here, and has said more than once that Kosova is the "red line" for the Serbs, even though the Serbs long ago crossed this line. It is perhaps for this reason that the United States "stops its ears" and wishes to swallow these murders, just as the Albanians do with lamentations and eruptions of feeling against the occupier. This pretence, or whatever we may call it, cannot calm the situation in Kosova, where the Albanians are subjected daily not only to violence and terror, but to murder on their own doorsteps.

The murder of an Albanian last Sunday [7 August] in Podujeve was not the first doorstep murder by the occupier. Nor was it the first occasion in recent times that the Serbian police have burned and razed to the ground an Albanian's house. Thirteen years ago, the then "joint" and "Yugoslav" police did the same thing in Drenice. Not only this. In the last three years, the Serbian police have even murdered Albanian women in their own yards and homes.

The Albanians have nowhere to go outside their own yards. Their yard is Kosova, and all the ethnic regions where they have lived in historical continuity and geographical compactness, regardless of the current administration by the Serbian invader. The world should know this, and does. It cannot allay its conscience simply with standard phrases of "We are concerned about the situation in Kosova and the violated rights of the Albanians there..."

The world must take tangible steps so that the Albanians in Kosova will not lose patience and reply to Serbian violence with violence. These tangible steps are to respect the political and institutional will of the Albanians expressed by all the Albanians in the former Yugoslavia, just as they respected the will of all the Slav peoples of the former Yugoslavia. The Albanians should even have priority in this sphere: They were thrust by force into this Yugoslavia when it was created, with the blessing of this same world.

It is time for the world to correct this historical error.

Ministry, RTSh Said Blocking Ethnic 'Truth'

AU1708092094 Tirana E DJATHTA in Albanian 12 Aug 94 pp 2, 4

[Unattributed article: "Is There Any Glimmer of Albanianism Left?"]

[Text]

1. Ministry of Justice

It is difficult to believe what REPUBLIKA wrote on 28 July 1994, announcing that the Ministry of Justice had not recognized the "Movement for the Recognition of Ethnic Albania" organization, writing instead the following note: "No approval, it has an ethnic character." According to its statute, this movement has undertaken to make known to the world the truth about ethnic Albania and the injustice meted out to Albanians in 1913. It is contrary to logic, therefore, to argue about the ethnic character of this movement. Even the Serbian or Greek ministries would not have dared to use such a formulation if they had to refuse this request.

Now the case has been passed to the Supreme Court for further consideration. As it seems, this court will have to dedicate a good part of its activity to redressing the justice minister's gaffes. We hope that the PD [Democratic Party] will not be angered by the minister's persecution.

2. Radio-Television

Unabated propaganda is being launched in Greece, full of insults, lies, and falsifications. In Albania, very little is done to confront this propaganda. Even when individual persons, indignant at what the Greeks are doing, try to undertake something serious to explain the truth about events and history, they are faced with almost unsurmountable hurdles placed in their way by state entities and propaganda organs. A year ago, a working meeting was held by the directorate of the RTSh [Albanian Radio-Television] and a program of concrete tasks was drafted to organize a cycle of television programs explaining the historical, ethnographic, and politico-diplomatic truth about Cameria and Epirus. For months and months, some invisible obstructive hands have barred everything in this direction. At long last, two television programs were put together and recorded, but, as the months passed, they were blocked. Who has barred them? Is it the ruling policymakers, who cannot help ingratiating themselves with Greece, or certain philhellenes in the RTSh? Perhaps Muharrem Bajraktari, the TV journalist, could answer this question?

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NATO Atlantic Commander Ends Official Visit

AU1608203894 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1600 GMT 16 Aug 94

[Text] Admiral Paul David Miller, commander in chief of the NATO Armed Forces in the Atlantic, ended his official visit to our country today.

At Sofia airport, he expressed satisfaction with the results of his talks with Defense Minister Valentin Aleksandrov; Nikolay Slatinski, chairman of the Parliamentary Commission on National Security; and with military experts from the Army General Staff.

Bulgarian officers will be sent for training to the U.S. base in Norfolk. The forthcoming establishment of joint operational-tactical groups under NATO command was also discussed.

Commentator Says Serbs Unmoved by U.S. 'Threat'

AU1608142894 Sofia KONTINENT in Bulgarian 13-14 Aug 94 p 4

[Commentary by Plamen Kulinski: "Laughable Threats"]

[Text] The United States has announced that it will ask the United Nations to lift the arms embargo against the Bosnian Muslims if the Bosnian Serbs fail to accept the "Contact Group's" peace plan by 15 October.

In Pale, they have probably already had a good laugh at this ultimatum. The threat cannot scare the Serbs, unless Izetbegovic is promised a nuclear bomb. First, their arsenals are full of dust-covered weapons, and second, the question has to be considered by the UN Security Council. There, not everyone is of the same mind, and Clinton's wish is unlikely to become reality unless the United States lifts the embargo unilaterally. However, this would cause the United States to lose its positions at the United Nations on other foreign policy issues.

In other respects, Clinton's actions have their own logic, because he has to satisfy the appetites of the U.S. manufacturers, who are now wondering where they can place their products. In Bosnia, in the meantime, arms plants have started to spring up like mushrooms after a rain shower. After again entering into an alliance with the Croatians last March, the Muslims can also count on several other manufacturers of death-dealing products.

The latest successes of the Muslim government army against both the Serbs and their co-religionists in Bihac have proved that weapons are not in short supply in Bosnia. Indeed, considerable quantities of combat hardware and munitions have slipped through the embargo's "loopholes," so that Washington will have to hurry if it wants to sell off its old iron.

Dimitrov Views Russia Visit, SDS Conflict

AU1608142494 Sofia DEMOKRATSIYA in Bulgarian 10 Aug 94 pp 1, 2

[Interview with Filip Dimitrov, chairman of the National Coordinating Council of the Union of Democratic Forces, SDS, by Polina Mikhaylova; place and date not given: "Crisis Within SDS Is Beginning To Resolve Itself"]

[Text] [Mikhaylova] You returned two days ago from Moscow, where you attended the conference of the World League for Liberty and Democracy. What are your impressions of Russia?

[Dimitrov] This was my first time in Russia. I think the visit was instructive. Russia is experiencing serious difficulties. We in Bulgaria are suffering from the economic collapse that the Berov pro-communist government has caused during the last year and a half. Nevertheless, the dollar exchanges for 54 leva, whereas in Russia the rate is 2,060 rubles. They have many problems, and it is rather amusing to listen to certain Bulgarian politicians talking about emerging from the crisis with Russia's help. It must be made clear that Russia needs help more than partnership.

[Mikhaylova] You established contacts with representatives of Russia's Choice and the Russian Democratic Reform movement. What problems does the Russian opposition face?

[Dimitrov] One of the interesting issues in Russia is the debate on who exactly is in the opposition at the moment. I regard this as an extremely interesting topic in itself. The representatives of the democratic movements in Russia are seeking a solution to the crisis, but this is not easy to find. What I find most important as a Bulgarian is whether the democratic formations in Russia will find the strength to dissociate from the purely imperialistic ideas and phraseology that continue to be bandied about there.

[Mikhaylova] Did representatives of any other former communist countries attend the conference?

[Dimitrov] Yes, from the Czech Republic and Hungary. With regret, I must report the information that I received from Hungary, namely that, only two months after the victory of the left wing (the former communist party), the situation of the people is already beginning to deteriorate.

[Mikhaylova] What did you find in Bulgaria on your return?

[Dimitrov] A further deterioration in the people's situation; a new rise in the prices of bread, meat, and all essential goods; yet another trick by Berov regarding compensation of incomes, and the professional red complainers who are wailing about the fate of their beloved SDS [Union of Democratic Forces]. The last thing is good; since the yellow and red press is complaining

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about us so much, this means that we represent a serious threat to the BKP [Bulgarian Communist Party, whose successor is the Bulgarian Socialist Party] and the mafia.

[Mikhaylova] Many people no longer believe that we will have new elections.

[Dimitrov] I have already pointed out that to form a new cabinet, some of our deputies will have to commit open betrayal. Only a great cover-up of the political crisis can preserve the Berov government. The SDS National Coordinating Council has worked hard these last two years to prevent this, and it will continue these efforts during September, because if no elections are held, the same robbery will continue, and then many people will really have to go hungry, while the country's financial position will become uncontrollable. This will create even more serious problems in 1995. When I hear that Mr. Berov is preparing a new budget, I start to shiver. What about you?

[Mikhaylova] Many people are worried because the problems within the SDS have remained unresolved, so that in September we will face the same conflicts. Does the SDS still exist, in fact?

[Dimitrov] Of course it exists. Moreover, the crisis in the SDS is beginning to clear up. It is true that unresolved problems remain within the coalition, but people most often look for problems where none exist. Some people continue to work against the SDS, using its name as a cover. This continues to be a problem, but it is not such a serious one when our supporters are certain about two things:

First, they know what we are fighting for, and second, they know that such people will no longer represent the SDS. They can write about themselves in the yellow press as much as they want, but we have the problem clearly defined. Please note, this does not mean some kind of mystical purity. Of course, dishonorable conduct is punished everywhere, but this is another question. What is necessary is to make everything clear so that the citizens know what positions the SDS will defend and what they can rely on. Accordingly, I say that the crisis in the SDS is already resolving itself. We have demonstrated that we will simply not retreat from our basic positions.

[Mikhaylova] Will there be a new political agreement? According to Georgi Petrov, this is supposed to create a new party.

[Dimitrov] Rubbish! I would not recommend anyone to try to make changes to the SDS structure except at a conference, and this is hardly likely to turn into a party. Regarding the question of a new agreement, this is also a fictitious problem. It is not so very important whether we will have a new agreement, an addendum to the old agreement, or resolutions on a few important issues. What is important is to define how the SDS behaves and the procedure for nominating candidates so as to guarantee continuity both at the center and at the local level. In this way, guarantees will be created to prevent any splitting off in the next parliament.

[Mikhaylova] Is this a guarantee that will prevent persons appearing on the lists of candidates whose names should not be there?

[Dimitrov] Yes, and there is no place for compromises on this matter. Discredited persons, people who work only for themselves, not for the SDS, and persons unacceptable to specific electors will not be included in our lists.

[Mikhaylova] Will you succeed in preserving a united parliamentary group after the beginning of September?

[Dimitrov] I do not know. It depends on whether all the deputies stand behind the positions defended by the SDS. If not, this will inevitably lead to fresh confrontations and clashes, and I believe that the SDS cannot present itself to Bulgaria as a chaotic organization.

[Mikhaylova] Will you seek a vote of no confidence in the government before the BSP [Bulgarian Socialist Party] does?

[Dimitrov] The National Coordinating Council will decide the precise moment when we should seek a vote of no confidence. It is clear that if the BSP delays, we should not hang about waiting. On the other hand, the lack of 121 votes [needed for a clear majority in the National Assembly] should not serve as a cover for those who want to preserve this parliament.

[Mikhaylova] There is a lot of talk about the Radical Democrats and Agrarians [Nikola Petkov Bulgarian National Agrarian Union, BZNS] splitting off to form an alliance with the Democrats and Mrs. Mozer's BZNS.

[Dimitrov] We suspended the membership of the Democratic Party, but did not expel it, because we are convinced that most of its members share the common SDS positions. This applies to all the parties in the SDS. From this point on, no one who considers leaving the SDS can count on success. As regards Mrs. Mozer, I believe that she has actually declared her readiness to cooperate with the SDS.

[Mikhaylova] Are you afraid of elections?

[Dimitrov] They are Bulgaria's only chance to introduce some kind of order, stop the mafia, provide people with some kind of security, and start improving their living conditions. If we manage to hold elections this autumn, the SDS has a very good chance of succeeding.

BSP Calls For Public Debate on Party Program

AU1608203994 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1600 GMT 16 Aug 94

[Text] Members and supporters of the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP] will have the opportunity to

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express their opinion on the party's new draft program from 15 September to 15 October 1994.

At today's meeting, the BSP Executive Bureau began debating the draft resolution on holding an all-party referendum related to the party's draft program.

The discussion is expected to be concluded next Tuesday [22 August], after which the Supreme Party Council and the BSP Parliamentary Group will express their views on the draft resolution.

According to Nikolay Dobrev, one of the authors of the draft program, the reason for the delay lies in the difficulties caused by a new form of work, such as the public referendum involving rank and file party members, and by the party's search for the best solutions in finalizing the ideological quests pursued over several years.

The BSP Executive Bureau today also heard reports on the work of BSP municipal organizations in connection with their preelection activities.

Agriculture Minister Predicts Bread Price Rise

AU1608185894 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1600 GMT 16 Aug 94

[Text] At a news conference today Minister of Agriculture Georgi Tanev declared that in view of the current grain purchasing prices, the price of bread will inevitably increase by six to seven leva toward the end of 1994. He added that it is out of question for the state to subsidize any agricultural product whatsoever.

Minister Tanev pointed out that his department will not permit the problem of the price of grain to be manipulated for political purposes and to become an instrument for blackmailing the state. The important thing is that the government has established minimum protected prices for bread grain, after which bread prices will be determined by the market.

At the same time BTA reports that in the town of Lovech bread prices have already increased by one leva as of today, while the management of the local bread factory has declared that bread prices will increase even further by 1 September 1994 at the latest, because of the constant increase in the prices of oil and flour.

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Carlos Reportedly in Prague During Clinton Visit

LD1708084294 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 0500 GMT 17 Aug 94

[Text] According to Czech police information, the international terrorist Ilich Ramirez Sanchez, known as Carlos, was presumably at the Ruzyne airport in Prague during the visit to Prague by U.S. President Bill Clinton in January.

An official at the police antiterrorist division, whose name was not released, said that the antiterrorism department of the central criminal police and the diplomatic protection directorate of the police headquarters had information from which one could presume that, during Clinton's visit, Carlos was in the transit lounge at Ruzyne airport.

However, at the same time, he characterized this information as unconfirmed. A few hours earlier, the Interior Ministry, through its spokeswoman, stated that information about Carlos's presence in the Czech Republic during this year's visit by U.S. Bill Clinton was unfounded.

During his European tour in mid-January, Clinton met the presidents of the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia in Prague. Tight security measures were in force during Clinton's visit to Prague. The presidents, including Clinton, landed and took off from Ruzyne airport, but from the part that is not used for normal traffic and that is sufficiently distant from the international transit lounge.

Ministry: Army Lacks Funds To Train Reservists

AU1608152394 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 12 Aug 94 p 1

[Article by "km": "The Army Lacks Funds, and Therefore Is Limiting Military Exercises"]

[Text] Prague—The Army canceled several planned military exercis because it does not have enough money to cover the cost of training the reserve soldiers and their lost wages.

The Ministry of Defense confirmed that only 10,000 reserve soldiers will be called for exercises this year, while the optimum for the defense readiness of the state would be to train approximately 25,000 reservists annually. Before 1990, approximately 150,000 men took part in the reserve exercises, and 39,000 reservists were called for exercises in the last year of federation.

The Army officials admit that the reduction of exercises will not contribute to the combat readiness of the Army, but they hope that these problems can be overcome by some understanding. The Czech Army is not the only one in the postcommunist countries that reduces military exercises for dearth of funds. Hungary, for instance, will not call a single reservist for exercises in the second half of the year. Approximately 350,000 reserve soldiers, who are supposed to be able to protect their country, are currently registered at the Ministry of Defense. This figure includes only the soldiers, by whom the time since the completion of their service or last military exercises has not exceeded five years.

Government Support for Agriculture Declines

94CH0372A Prague PRAGUE POST in English 2 Aug 94 p 7

[Article by Lubomir Sedlak: "As Government Tightens Belt, Farm Sector Cries Out for Help"]

[Text] Beset by declining revenues and rising unemployment, Czech farmers are complaining that they are not able to reap what they sow when it comes to getting support from the state.

But their complaints are getting little support from the Klaus administration, which is committed to slashing agricultural subsidies.

In 1993, the Czech agriculture sector paid 10.7 billion Kc ($390 million) to the state through taxes, but it got only 7.7 billion Kc [korunas] ($280 million) back through subsidies.

According to the Czech Confederation of Entrepreneurs and Employers, in most developed states, the tax-subsidy equation is the other way round. In Germany, for instance, agricultural subsidies are seven times as high as taxes on agriculture.

In addition, the agriculture sector gets only 3.8 percent of the total money invested in the Czech Republic, compared with the average 12.6 percent it received through the 1980s.

And except for animal breeders, farmers are having to cope with lower prices for their products, due to declining demand. Prices for animal products rose 14.4 percent last year, barely keeping pace with the inflation rate. Meanwhile, prices for plant products, including fruits and vegetables, dropped an average of 5.8 percent, with potatoes plummeting 30.2 percent.

The 11.6 percent annual jump in agricultural prices, buoyed by the relatively high animal-products prices, is still behind price hikes in other sectors. Construction prices, for instance, rose 14.1 percent between June 1993 and last month.

The latest survey from the Czech Statistical Office reports that sales of all basic agricultural commodities dropped sharply in the first four months of the year. Poultry sales fell 27.6 percent, beef 9 percent, milk 6.6 percent, eggs 4.8 percent and pork 4.4 percent.

As a result, farming operations today are losing money or going out of business. Between 1991 and 1993, the agriculture sector lost more than 30 billion Kc (about $1.1 billion).

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The entrepreneurs association has started pushing for more protection of farming operations. But, some say, it may be too late to save the beleaguered industry.

Bohumir Dufek, who heads the Trade Union of Workers in Agriculture, warns that the number of people employed in agriculture, which dropped by 50 percent between 1989 and 1993, will continue to decline as some employers use layoffs to cut costs.

"Most of those who lost their jobs in the republic's four regions hardest hit by unemployment used to work for local state farms that have gone bankrupt," Dufek says, adding that unless the agricultural sector improves, the unemployed workers will need retraining for non-farm jobs.

Finance Minister Ivan Kocarnik is not so pessimistic, noting that major commodities here, such as grain and meat, are still protected from subsidized imports by the low exchange rate of the Czech crown.

He adds that Czech farms are getting business from a growing number of foreign companies that are setting up shop here. He notes, for example, that Danone-brand yogurts sold here are made from 100 percent Czech milk.

And Agriculture Minister Josef Lux suggests that government help to farms could be on the way via the Forestry and Farming Support and Guarantee Fund, which is offering to buy out farmers' claims on dairies and meat-processing plants for 80 percent of their value—or 60 percent for farms that are shutting down.

In addition, the Agriculture Ministry is working in cooperation with the Environment Ministry to offer money to farmers who will set aside part of their property for the development of natural grasslands.

Private farms currently extend over 85 percent of all agricultural land. The Agriculture Ministry is willing to pay farmers 2,000 Kc for every hectare of land that they set aside for grasslands.

Agriculture Minister Lux stresses that the program is not meant to encourage more intensive agricultural activities, but is instead meant to support farms as a mechanism for maintaining rural areas.

The program, which is scheduled to get off the ground next month, will have an annual budget of around 1 billion Kc, Lux says, with half the money coming from his ministry and half from the Environment Ministry.

Farm operations account for 5 percent of the gross domestic product. And related food-processing operations make up an additional 7 percent.

A recent prediction from the Czech Statistics Office is that 7.2 million tons of cereal grains will be harvested this year, with the average hectare of land yielding about 4.4 tons—as high as 5.7 tons in the region around Olomouc.

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Foreign Minister Denies Selling Arms to Syria

MM1608155594 London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic 16 Aug 94 p 2

[Article by 'Abd-al-Ilah al-Nu'aymi: "Slovak Foreign Minister Tells AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT: We Did Not Agree To Supply Syria With Arms"]

[Excerpts] Bratislava—Slovak Foreign Minister Eduard Kukan has denied that during his recent visit to Damascus he signed agreements to supply Syria with arms. He told AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT that press reports about the conclusion of military contracts with Syria are absolutely baseless. He said that he signed a cooperation agreement between the Slovak and the Syrian Foreign Ministries.

The Slovak foreign minister made a tour of the Arab region that took him to Egypt, Syria, and Jordan. On the aims of the visit he said: It was aimed at expressing the Slovak Republic's keenness to establish cordial relations with the Arab countries and build bridges of cooperation with them. [passage omitted]

On the new position on the arms trade, the Slovak foreign minister said that, after the revolution that ended communist rule in the Czechoslovak Federation late in 1989, officials decided to suspend military production and arms exports. The decision was noble and exemplary with regard to its objectives. However, it had not been studied from all aspects. Production of Slovak arms factories dropped by 94 percent. They now produce just 6 percent of the 1989 output, which has caused numerous problems for us: unemployment, rehabilitation of military industry workers, and loss of revenue. When we tried to convert military production to civilian production, we discovered that this project requires a lot of financial resources and investment. This is why the government opted for another alternative—resuming military production at a certain rate and for a specified period, while complying with strict rules, because we will not export arms to trouble spots and areas of conflict. And we will use the revenue from arms sales to convert military production to civilian purposes.

Asked whether the Slovak Government intends to restore military production to prerevolution levels, he said: That cannot be answered exactly. However, I can say that we will manufacture one-third of the arms we used to manufacture—that is, an increase from the present rate of 6 percent to 35.3 percent.

While talking about arms, trouble spots, and regional disputes, the Slovak foreign minister pointed to his country's wish to join NATO. Asked whether Slovakia feels threatened by dangers prompting it to seek protection from NATO, the minister said that "Slovakia does not see any direct threat to its security. But, in view of what is happening in areas very close to our country, one cannot predict what direction events will take. We believe that there is a need to secure a certain amount of security guarantees."

The minister was referring to the war in Bosnia. He stressed that "it is important that what is happening in Yugoslavia does not extend to other areas. [passage omitted]

Kovac Responds to Meciar's 'Big Untruths'

AU1608124694 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 11 Aug 94 p 13

[Second and last installment of "highlights" of "discussion" with President Michal Kovac organized by the West Slovak regional daily HLAS LUDU in Bratislava; date not given: "President Michal Kovac: Slovakia Has a Future"—reprinted from HLAS LUDU No. 180]

[Text] [HLAS LUDU] You forgot to reveal your ideas with regard to Slovakia's future....

[Kovac] I would not be myself if I did not reply that I see this future as promising. The Slovak nation has the historic chance to carry out several processes concurrently. We are getting rid of totalitarian habits in our attitudes, thinking, and way of doing things and are learning to live in a democratically arranged world. Moreover, we are carrying out the transformation of our economy and have the chance to decide freely which structures we want to join. There exists the decision to become integrated in the European security, political, and economic structures. We have the opportunity to participate in building the new foundations of Europe, from which the antagonism of interests has disappeared. There exist great differences not only in the way of thinking, in living standards, and in the economy in general, but also in the conditions for eliminating those differences, with assistance from others. I am confident that Slovakia will close this gap quickly and will soon become a respected country, not only in Europe.

[HLAS LUDU] The overwhelming majority of people acknowledge your being above party affairs in your conduct. Only in the movement from which you have emerged do they hold it against you. On what do you base your nonpartisanship?

[Kovac] On the Constitution of the Slovak Republic and on the oath that I took on my inauguration. I am under the obligation to defend the interests of the citizens; there is nowhere any mention of the interests of a political party or movement. Also, the government should behave in this way because, regardless of which party had won the election, the government is a government of all citizens. If this were the case, the president's task would also be easier.... When I assumed the position of a president above party affairs, some people from the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS] started reproaching me for having betrayed the movement. What was I supposed to do? Was I supposed to ignore the majority that did not vote for the HZDS but for other parties? That would be incorrect and unworthy of the president of the Republic. When I criticized the conduct

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of Vladimir Meciar in the post of prime minister, I was criticizing neither the HZDS nor the government.

[HLAS LUDU] Vladimir Meciar has been speaking about the possibility of your being recalled.... The reason: some of your mistakes. He is reproaching you specifically for your proposal to write off enterprise debts from National Property Fund resources and for other things, including your refusal to seek reconciliation with him.

[Kovac] I thoroughly studied the interview with Vladimir Meciar that you published in this column. I told myself that I would not react to it. I considered it pointless. That is why I did not react also to other attacks. Some citizens say reproachfully that supposedly I am silent because apparently I have nothing to say in my defense. I am not in favor of our soiling our own nest. Vladimir Meciar is, after all, a prominent public personality. On the other hand, however, I feel responsibility toward citizens who have a distorted picture of my thinking, conduct, and activities, particularly those who lend credence to Vladimir Meciar. I therefore have to defend myself. Vladimir Meciar said four big untruths in your newspaper. The first was his accusation that I had demanded his immediate resignation on the ground of his loss of trust in the National Council of the Slovak Republic [NRSR]. I have never said such a thing—quite the contrary. About a year ago, during talks between the president and the HZDS chairman at the Castle, immediately after the HZDS's abortive talks with the Slovak National Party [SNS] [on the formation of a coalition], I offered a solution to him. This happened in a situation when Mr. Meciar slandered Ludovit Cernak and when I got the impression that the coalition with the SNS would not materialize. I asked him what he intended to do next, and, at the same time, I recommended to him that he submit his resignation, upon which I would entrust him again with the formation of a broader coalition government. I drew his attention to the fact that, if he did not tender his resignation and if parliament later passed a vote of no confidence in him, I would no longer be able to entrust him with government formation.

[HLAS LUDU] That is only one instance....

[Kovac] The second untruth in the interview—and I regret that it came from the mouth of the former prime minister—was that I had supposedly refused to sit down with him and NRSR Chairman Ivan Gasparovic in order to set matters right. What is more, I had supposedly been seeking his dismissal as early as March 1993. Had I really been seeking his dismissal, I would have had an opportunity for it at the time of the Milan Knazko affair. At that time, Vladimir Meciar said: It is either Milan Knazko or I. Had I been interested in Vladimir Meciar's departure from his post, it would have been enough to refuse to recall Milan Knazko and thereby force Vladimir Meciar to leave. It is not true that I had been seeking his dismissal since March 1993 and that I refused to meet him. Between July 1993 and March 1994, we met 29 times. We had lunch together virtually every Monday.

[Text] [HLAS LUDU] These are still only two instances....

[Kovac] He had supposedly reproached me severely for the "gas affair," which may have offended me. This supposedly happened between four eyes. Again, nothing of that sort happened. Vladimir Meciar never reproached me for anything regarding gas. Unfortunately, the "gas affair" was fabricated by Mr. Meciar. What was the matter? Still, as chairman of the Federal Assembly, I had received an offer from the U.S. Morgan Stanley Corporation for financial assistance to Slovakia. Meanwhile, I became president, and the group called on me again and asked: How can we help your country? I told them we could use a loan of about $1 billion for [illegible] economy and passed the matter on to [then Finance Minister] Julius Toth and [National Bank Governor] Vladimir Masar. I asked them whether they had submitted the matter to the government, and, when they replied that they did, I was satisfied that the matter was in the right hands, under the government's control. I routinely briefed Mr. Meciar about the offer, telling him also that the minister of finance was taking charge of it. In his suspicion, Mr. Meciar apparently later started to construe and analyze the planned agreements, in which—and I do not deny this—there may have been mistakes. To deduce from this, however, that I was the architect of some sort of "gas affair" and that he had supposedly warned me is illogical! Personally, I have inhibitions against protesting against accusations that he expediently makes against us because my ethics are different. However, when things are portrayed as though everyone was unfair, a liar, and corrupt, while there exists only one pure person, which is Vladimir Meciar, I have to defend myself because this does not correspond to the truth and is damaging to Slovakia. I cannot be a party to untruth, and I feel obliged to introduce clarity into the affair. And that I am interfering in the economy? I thought that the prime minister would take into consideration my lifelong economic career.... In the few years of his work in public posts, he could not have learned so much about the economy as people who had studied it and dealt with it for many years. I wanted to be useful and offered in good faith some findings. When I found out, however, that the prime minister was approaching this as a matter of prestige, I quieted down. In the final analysis, my decisions, as those of the president, would not have had any legal validity anyway. Decisions must be made by the government.

[HLAS LUDU] You have not replied to the question concerning former Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar's call on you to resign. What do you think about it...?

[Kovac] Speaking in Zvolen recently, he even said that, if the HZDS does well in the election, it will take steps to set up a commission of inquiry to look into the president's activities. He spoke in similar terms at an HZDS

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rally at the Bratislava indoor stadium, where he announced that, after the election, in the new parliament, the HZDS would raise the issue of the president's responsibility. He may have forgotten that the NRSR can recall the president only when he is engaged in activities directed against the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Slovakia or at bringing down the constitutional democratic system....

He is convinced that he is the personification of Slovakia's interests. He is convinced that, if Slovakia is not governed by him, it will collapse. Consequently, everything that is against him runs counter to the interests of Slovakia. When the president is out of tune with Vladimir Meciar, he is against Slovakia. The belief that only I embody Slovakia's interests is unacceptable for our democracy.... Should Vladimir Meciar seek the dismissal of Michal Kovac, I will not prevent him from doing so, but I know that it will not benefit the Republic's interests. It would not be a tragedy for me; in a way, it would rather mean liberation from a very complicated and difficult situation. However, I do not have the right to resign on the basis of psychological pressure by a group of people without taking into account the trust of other sections of the population. Of course, I would not be able to force myself upon the people. I must even be prepared for cooperation with Vladimir Meciar should he be entrusted with the formation of a coalition government.

Coexistence Pledges Support for Government

LD1608163594 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1000 GMT 16 Aug 94

[Excerpts] At the news briefing by the Coexistence movement today, the movement's representatives said they were concerned at the actions of those who represent the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia and the Slovak National Party. Their actions are aimed at putting a question mark over the Slovak Electoral Commission. At the same time, they generate mistrust and indignation among the public, they felt. Coexistence also supports the government's efforts to prevent a referendum on the issue of the origin of privatization funds approved by the parliament in July 1994.

Radiozurnal was represented at the news briefing by Bernard Hornak. He invited the movement's deputy chairman Arpad Duka Zolyomi to the microphone to discuss some pressing problems with him.

[Begin recording] [Hornak] You said recently that Hungarian parties in Slovakia were somewhat dissatisfied with cooperation on certain issues with the current government. You said you would push for a meeting of the coalition council to discuss issues pertaining to Hungarian minorities. If an agreement were not reached, there is a chance that your party would withdraw its support for the coalition at the 37th meeting of the parliament. Are you still dissatisfied?

[Zolyomi] There are certain areas where agreement failed to materialize in the form in which it was initially agreed upon, especially in terms of the eight points we set out. We are compelled to voice our dissatisfaction because our ideas or problems—for example, in the sphere of education—were not resolved. The situation there is deadlocked. In fact, nothing has happened there, and it can be said that nothing is evidently likely to happen before the elections. I regret that we failed to attain all of this, step by step, and that, as part of cooperation within the coalition, we failed to deal with the problems as we intended to.

[Hornak] Irrespective of this dissatisfaction, are you still going to give your backing to the government coalition at the parliament's 37th meeting?

[Zolyomi] Yes, we will. For the time being there is a real resolve to back the government irrespective of these objections because we realize that the political situation in Slovakia is not simple, that it is a complex situation. Our assessments of it must be made from various angles, by taking into consideration various yardsticks.

[Hornak] Jan Carnogursky, the chairman of the Christian Democratic Movement [KDH], said in connection with the postelection coalition or, rather, cooperation that, in the case of a coalition of the three Hungarian parties in Slovakia, the idea of postelection cooperation was out of the question if the Hungarian parties adhered to the Komarno appeal [for the autonomy of Zitny Ostrov].

[Zolyomi] Hearing statements of this kind, especially from a party leader and the KDH chairman, in particular, makes me feel rather disgusted. After all, a dialogue and cooperation were initiated after 11 March [when the present government took office]. [passage omitted]

We think that the postelection coalition will be a coalition in which we could take part, too.

Indeed, we want to cooperate with Slovak political parties and movements even after the elections, provided an appropriate climate and conditions exist. [end recording]

Former Communists Expected in Next Government

94CH0369A Prague RESPEKT in Czech No 29, 18-24 Jul 94 p 3

[Article by Peter Schutz: "The Slovak Countdown"]

[Text] Only 10 weeks are left before the inhabitants of Slovakia will, for the first time, approach their ballot boxes as citizens of an independent state. In proven democracies, this is a time when it is already clear how the elections are likely to come out. In Slovakia, the situation is different: The closer the October deadline for the elections comes, the less it is clear what will happen after that.

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The reason involves a whole series of causes that are based on inadequate crystallization of the Slovak political scene and on the fact that, despite the creation of the most varied preelection coalitions, the majority of the parties, including the strongest among them, is behaving in an incalculable manner. Thus, everything indicates that today's division in parliament into a pro-Meciar and an anti-Meciar bloc will continue to be the focal point of Slovak politics. Of course, the question of who will stand on which side of the barricades remains.

The most recent sociological data provided by the public opinion poll conducted at the end of June and the beginning of July was published by the Focus agency (one of three institutions that regularly conduct public opinion polls in Slovakia). Much like previous polls, even this investigation confirmed the unshakable "leading role" played by Meciar's HZDS [Movement for a Democratic Slovakia], which enjoys the support of not quite 28 percent of the electorate (the data are computed solely on the basis of election preferences of people who declare their willingness to participate in the elections—78 percent of respondents). Although this amounts to a modest increase compared to the beginning of June, the number is still about 4 percentage points lower than indicated by a Focus poll conducted immediately after Meciar was deposed and is precisely 10 percent lower than was the case in June 1992. The winner of the elections is thus known (formally, it is the coalition between the HZDS and the political dwarf, the Farmers Party (Rolnicka strana [RS])). What is also clear is the fact that no one else has a chance of catching up with the HZDS head start.

The second-strongest formation is the so-called leftist option, with 15 percent, which is the "working title" of the coalition between the Party of the Democratic Left [SDL], the Social Democrats, the Greens, and the Movement of Agricultural Workers. However, this grouping lost 5 percentage points in its standing since the beginning of June. What is interesting is that, before this coalition came into being, the independent SDL was polling 15 percent, the Greens were polling about 4.5 percent, and the Social Democrats were polling their stable 2 to 3 percent.

Traditionally, the "bronze medal" belongs to the Christian Democrats, with somewhat more than 9 percentage points. The Carnogursky movement has the most stable of electoral bases, something that is manifesting itself in the long term by the smallest deviations in the polls, and it would therefore be a great surprise if it polled less than 8 percent and more than 10 percent of the votes during the election. This is not altered by the fact that even proponents of the one-time government-backed ODU [Civic Democratic Union], which no longer exists, will find their way onto the KDH [Christian Democratic Movement] candidate lists, going "along for the ride" in electable locations (for example, Jan Langos, Milan Sutovec, and Anton Vavro).

Another party that made it into parliament according to the July data published by Focus is Moravcik's Democratic Union (9 percent). Its candidate lists will, for a change, include "guest performances" by representatives of Cernak's National Democratic Party [NDS] (the NDS is a splinter faction of the Slovak National Party). A similar number of sympathizers is even enjoyed by the "authentic" SNS [Slovak National Party] of Jan Slota, which has thus, for the first time since its splintering, exceeded the limit of 5 percent. One percentage point less (an even 8 percent) is polled by the coalition of the Hungarian Christian Democratic Movement and the Coexistence Movement (MKDH-ESWS). The seventh-longest formation, as indicated by Focus data, is the bloc of the Democratic Party [DS] and the Party of Entrepreneurs and Businessmen (SPZ), which accounted for 7 percent of the vote. The final entry on the listing of those who have managed to get into parliament is the pike in the Slovak preelection pond, the extremely leftist Association of Slovak Workers (ZRS), which polled not quite 7 percent of all of the votes.

Compared with 1992, when virtually one-fourth of all votes cast in Slovakia went to parties that failed to achieve even the 5 percent necessary for entrance into parliament, the situation has changed expressly. A clear indicator is the cumulative percentage of votes held by potential parliamentary parties—91.4 percent, which is an irrefutable prediction of the fact that this time there will not be so much redistribution at the second level of scrutiny.

Focus was interested even in the prospects of those coalitions that did not exist during the conduct of the public opinion poll, but whose coming into being is realistic. A possibly broad bloc composed of Moravcik's Democratic Union, the Cernak people, the Democratic Party, and the Entrepreneur Party would theoretically account for 16 percent of the votes. Together with the "leftist option," it would thus become the second-strongest parliamentary grouping. It is, of course, equally possible that, thanks to the internal crisis within the Democratic Party, the coalition between the DS and the Party of Entrepreneurs and Businessmen could fall apart. As a consequence, this would mean that at least one of these parties would fail to reach the required 5 percent. A coalition with "Moravcik's people" could thus save the votes of the "Democratic Entrepreneurial Bloc," at a minimum, from falling out of consideration. And, because all preelection considerations are dominated by the pro- or anti-Meciar scheme, saving the votes of two extraparliamentary parties who are, for the time being, not overly important, becomes a matter of fatal importance.

Focus attributes to the current government coalition a total of 33 percent, but, together with the "silent partner," the Hungarian MKDH-ESWS coalition, it allocates it 41 percent. Today's opposition (the HZDS and the SNS) is judged to control a total of 36.5 percent. And, because it is virtually out of the question for the communists in the Association of Workers of Slovakia to

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strengthen the ranks of the present coalition (it is entirely possible that they would not even join a government headed by Meciar), this would mean that the "opposition 43 percent" would be standing against the 41 percent of today's broad coalition, including the Hungarians. To the extent to which the Hungarian parties will thus not join the side of the present government coalition, the formation of a strong "anti-Meciar" government will become impossible. From this, it is clearly evident how important it is for the "anti-Meciar" bloc to save the votes of the Democratic Party and the Party of Entrepreneurs and Businessmen.

However, there is yet another model that will not be dependent upon such "drugstore" computations—an alliance between the left or its decisive portion with the Nationalists. Despite the fact that the Weiss SDL is today part of the anti-Meciar front, it is nowhere written that this will be the case even after the elections. For the time being, the press is not speculating on anything like that—Meciar and Weiss are attacking each other so hard that, at first glance, it really looks like utopia—but Slovakia has already experienced similar political turnarounds. As has already been indicated, the future coalition will clearly have to be somewhat "broader" than that of today—broadened either by the addition of "rightists" or Hungarians—which could bring about tensions within the SDL. And this can even lead to the removal of Weiss, the hitherto greatest opponent of the coalition with the HZDS. For the time being, however, one thing is certain. The Party of the Democratic Left will be a part of the next Slovak Government.

But there is also the possibility that no government will come out of the early election. Slovakia would then be confronted with an additional early election and chaos, the consequences of which cannot be foreseen. Many Slovaks are already convinced, incidentally, that an additional early election will not pass by their country.

Hungarian Allegedly Markus's Mother Tongue

94CH0369B Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech 15 Jul 94 p 7

[Unattributed article: "The Markuses: Slovaks as Well as Hungarians"]

[Text] Kosice—Until the end of World War II, the family of Jozef Markus, the chairman of the Matice Slovak cultural organization, who together with the leadership of this originally independent cultural organization is currently openly supporting the nationalistic and populist Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS) and the Slovak Nationalist Party [SNS], lived in Hungary. In an interview with the weekly DOMINO-EFEKT, this is noted by the brother of the Matice Slovak chairman, Stefan Markus.

"Very few people know that even as a family we lived like Hungarians until I was 10 years old," says Stefan Markus, who does not make a secret of the fact that his political views are specifically different from those of his brother. "Jozef is the younger, and the difference between us was obviously brought about by the fact that we had two different mothers. I was born to the first one, who was a Slovak national," he explains. "The second mother was a German. When she arrived on the scene, we suddenly began using German in addition to Hungarian. Until that time, we spoke only Hungarian at home, but she only knew how to speak German. As a child, Jozef grew up more under the Germano-Hungarian cultural influence. When, shortly after the war, the repatriation action was initiated, the parents decided to move to Slovakia, and suddenly we were Slovaks," says Stefan Markus.

After arriving in Slovakia, Stefan began attending the Slovak gymnasium at Kezmarok, where he began learning Slovak intensively. "By the time I was already communicating in Slovak, Jozef was still speaking German-Hungarian with his mother. When my sister and I did not want Jozef to understand something we were saying, we spoke in Slovak. He then used to run to his mother complaining: They are speaking Slovak again!" Stefan confesses. "Had we not come to Slovakia after the war, we would be dyed-in-the-wool Hungarians to this day," says Stefan. Currently, Jozef Markus, along with the leadership of the Matice organization, is taking a sharp stand even against laws that have been adopted that make it possible for members of minorities to register their names in vital statistics registries in their native tongue and to designate communities and towns in the language of the minority nationality.

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Minister Discusses Carlos' Hungarian Activities

LD1608204194 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1630 GMT 16 Aug 94

[Interview with Bela Katona, minister without portfolio in charge of the National Security Office, by Karoly Avar; place and date not given; from the "Extra" program—recorded]

[Excerpts] [Avar] What did Carlos do in Budapest? Did he negotiate with anybody? If yes, to what level did he get?

[Katona] Following Balazs Horvath's [first interior minister in the previous government] ominous speech in the parliament, the public learned that Carlos and his accomplices indeed stayed in Hungary—twice and for a long period. First, between 1979 and 1982, with several journeys in and out of the country, and then in 1984-85 for a shorter period.

It is also known that the Hungarian secret service wanted to continually monitor the group's movement in Hungary, and finally it tried to oust the well-known terrorists from the country by various means. They did not take the risk—and perhaps with reason at the time—of acting openly and exposing the country to the threat of terrorism.

[Avar] Now, after Carlos's arrest the western and the Hungarian press is full of references to the effect that Carlos and his accomplices did more than that in Hungary. They were supported here, they were able to relax and conduct negotiations with various secret service heads. It has been said that they might have reached political circles? Can the minister say something about this?

[Katona] Just what the Prosecutor's Office established at the time. Following the announcement in parliament in 1990, the Prosecutor's Office investigated the files, photos, and video footage in connection with the Carlos affair for almost a year. After this it closed the investigation and established that the secret service operating at the relevant time was not responsible for abetting or cooperating with the Carlos group.

There were negotiations between certain heads of the secret service and the Carlos group. These negotiations, however, were confined only to the discussion of the details of their departure from the country. [passage omitted] Before that they only paid attention to monitoring and checking the activities of the group.

[Avar] You mentioned the investigations by the Prosecutor's Office in 1990-91. Now that you have briefed yourselves on the issue, can you confirm that the secret service of the Hungarian regime of the time could not have indirectly helped the Carlos group—under any political instruction, plan or intention?

[Katona] The Prosecutor's Office investigated the affair for nearly a year. I only had an afternoon to brief myself about it. It seems that my brief investigation came to the same conclusion as the prosecutor's office, that is, the Hungarian services had never, for any moment, for any reason, cooperated with the Carlos group. Their every effort was aimed at neutralizing them and later at peacefully persuading the very dangerous terrorists to leave the country.

[Avar] One might think that there had been an intention to drive out the group—and I imagine that the affair was embarrassing for the country in 1979, the West already knew something about it, at least there was speculation in the press—so why did two or three years have to pass for such a small group to be driven out by a state which moreover had a strong police force? Was there perhaps no need to fear that they might carry out attacks here?

[Katona] This is precisely what was feared. The question at the time was not whether some of the known people could be driven out from the country by police means or by some other means of force. There was much more of a danger that their contacts who were not in range of vision might carry out an attack in Hungary as a consequence of, or in retaliation for, such a move.

[Avar] A final question: According to your information, when did Carlos last spend time in Hungary?

[Katona] According to our information he was last here in 1985, the beginning of 1985. An order was issued for the border to be firmly closed against him and his well-known men; from this time onwards they were in principle unable to enter the country under their most recently known names or under other names, since the border guard had photographs.

Former Minister Cited

LD1608221994 Budapest MTV Television Network in Hungarian 1800 GMT 16 Aug 94

[Excerpts] The world's attention is on Hungary again—now because of Carlos, the ill-famed terrorist. [passage omitted on arrest] The world media has to rely on information leaking from Hungary, for the Carlos group was Hungary's guest for a longer period in the eighties.

However, the rumor that the Hungarian leadership supported their action is not true. They were even asked to leave, after a while. They, allegedly, did not act against them in a tougher way because they were afraid of retaliatory terrorist actions.

[Unidentified correspondent] [Passage omitted] The Hungarian counterterrorist agents realized that Carlos had smuggled weapons into the country and several times violated Hungarian law. Then he was invited to a secret meeting, where he was told that he had to put an end to his activities in Hungary. Even a video recording was made at the meeting. This was shown on "Panorama" on Hungarian Television in 1990. The pictures were shown worldwide as a sensation. [indistinct passage]

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In 1990, at the time of the change of the regime, it was suspected that the Hungarian secret services had committed the crime of complicity when they had not arrested Carlos. [passage omitted on year-long investigation which dropped the charge]

Balazs Horvath, minister of interior of the time, maintains his position taken at that time.

[Begin Horvath recording] The Hungarian State and party leadership of the time was in close contact with the Carlos group and made it possible for them to acquire means and prepare, in Hungary, for their crimes committed in Western Europe or elsewhere. They could travel; they could prepare here; they could have a rest here. This assistance is a crime. [end recording]

[Correspondent] According to the Hungarian secret service officer who held talks with Carlos at the time, although the terrorist had offered his services to Hungary, the authorities did not accept his offer.

[Begin recording] [Unidentified Secret Service officer] He, for that matter, offered his services in return for tolerating his stay in Hungary. He also offered to hand over the information at his disposal to us.

[Correspondent] This is an appealing offer. Did you waver for a minute?

[Secret Service officer] Yes. It was an appealing offer, but I held to our principled position, which I represented from the first minute of my dealing with terrorism. I told him that our principled stance is as follows: We do not infiltrate into terrorist organizations, not even for intelligence purposes, since terrorist organizations will, sooner or later, be overcome. [end recording] [passage omitted]

[Begin Secret Service officer recording] We were sure that if Carlos—or any member of his group, but particularly Carlos—had been arrested, or proceedings had been launched against him, or even had he been extradited by Hungarian authorities, we would have provoked retaliation against Hungary by the entire terrorist group, which consists of numerous people. [end recording]

[Announcer] It is almost certain that the success of the Middle East peace talks put an end to the invulnerability of Carlos.

NATO Commander Cited on Improving Relations

LD1608210494 Budapest MTV Television Network in Hungarian 1800 GMT 16 Aug 94

[Excerpts] The process of reconciliation has an effect on the relationship between Hungary and NATO, but their relations are improving independently of this. This was said in Budapest by General George Joulwan, NATO's supreme allied commander of Europe, who is the first top-ranking military politician visiting Hungary.

[Unidentified correspondent] [Passage omitted] The supreme allied commander of Europe reassured Janos Deak, Hungarian Army commander, that there were still no obstacles in the way of Hungary and NATO getting closer to each other. He might have considered it important to say this because the news on the death of Manfred Woerner, NATO secretary general, might have caused uncertainty in the Hungarian military leadership.

Ambassador to Belgium Resigns, Views EU Issues

BR1608145294 Brussels LE SOIR in French 16 Aug 94 p 2

[Interview with Gyorgy Granasztoi, former Hungarian ambassador in Brussels, by Pol Mathil; place, date not given: "The East: 'A Patient With no Pharmacist'"]

[Excerpt] [Passage omitted] [Mathil] Without great success, the countries of Central Europe are criticizing the slowness of the process of their integration into Western structures.

[Granasztoi] We have not achieved our principal objective which was our integration into Western security structures, into NATO. We know the reasons, notably the fear of "driving Russia to despair." The result has been that formal security guarantees have proved very difficult to obtain in practice. We have learned to be realistic and pragmatic, but we continue to stress the need for urgency.

Countries such as Hungary, Poland, or the Czech Republic are at an extremely sensitive stage in their development. On the one hand, we are engaged in a very delicate process of far-reaching economic reforms, involving enormous sacrifices and posing serious risks. On the other hand, at this time of extreme vulnerability, of "sickness" you could say, Western "pharmacies" are closing their doors on us.

[Mathil] The West also has its problems.

[Granasztoi] Certainly. We understand that the recession in the West is going to delay the taking of any strictly economic decisions in our favor. But we believed that, given the normal democratic functioning of our political institutions, security aspects would be easier to resolve.

[Mathil] Your last "wish"?

[Granasztoi] What I would most like to take away with me is the clear message, without any ambiguity, that we are already on the road to integration from which there can be no turning back.

[Mathil] But have you not been assured that it is not a question of "if" but of "when"?

[Granasztoi] Yes, but not at the institutional level.

[Mathil] Are you afraid that if "something" were to happen, the West would abandon you?

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[Granasztoi] Journalists put this question on a number of occasions to Manfred Worner, the sadly missed NATO secretary general, to whom I would like to pay tribute on this occasion. He replied that "if something happened" to Hungary, the West would not stand idly by. That falls considerably short of a formal guarantee, but it did reassure us a great deal.

[Mathil] But what are you afraid of?

[Granasztoi] Since the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary, we do not believe there can be a military threat. But there are various kinds of security risks (civil wars or putsches in the region, population movements, a threat to the 400,000 Hungarians in Yugoslav Voivodina) which could very quickly get out of control.

[Mathil] Should we conclude that you are leaving Brussels a disappointed ambassador?

[Granasztoi] No, on the contrary. I leave with the awareness that the results are not as we would hope, but also pleased with the position and authority which a democratic Hungary has acquired on the Belgian and the international stage.

[Mathil] So why is it that you are resigning your post in Brussels, a rare event in the history of diplomacy?

[Granasztoi] My resignation has nothing to do with the foreign policy conducted by the new government of the left as democratically elected by a majority of our citizens. I am not in disagreement with this policy. I also accept the principle that a government can dismiss ambassadors in whom it has no confidence.

The reasons that led me to resign lie elsewhere. During the campaign for the legislature in Hungary, the leaders of the left criticized six ambassadors for featuring on the electoral lists of the Democratic Forum, the party in power since the collapse of communism and the principal loser at the elections. I accepted, for purely symbolic reasons, to feature in position 124 on this party's list. This was a sort of token expression of support, with virtually no chance of actually being elected. Yet this was enough for the new government to level criticisms at me which are damaging to my authority and to my credibility as head of the Hungarian mission to the Belgians and different international institutions.

An Unprecedented Resignation

[Mathil] Is it a matter of personal vengeance?

[Granasztoi] I do not believe so. We are at the learning stage in the functioning of democratic institutions, and thus of the diplomatic service. After all, this is the first change of government in Hungary since the revolution in 1989.

[Mathil] What is strange, however, is that in Poland also, 10 months after the left came to power, new ambassadors, also "nonprofessionals," were similarly attacked. Above and beyond individuals and vengeance, is not something more fundamental at stake here, namely the review of foreign policy in general? Did not Mr. Laszio Kovacs, new foreign minister in the Hungarian leftist government, declare "an urgent need to find out whether the new ambassadors are ready to adhere to a very different political conception than that of the previous government?" Should we expect some major changes in Budapest's foreign policy toward the European Union and NATO?

[Granasztoi] Most definitely not. I am not going to discuss the Polish situation. But I know Mr. Kovacs who was also president of the Foreign Affairs Committee in the previous parliament. In this capacity, he stated, notably to [Prime Minister] Dehaene when he visited Budapest, that 90 percent of his party was in agreement with the essential priorities of Hungarian foreign policy. There has been no change since then. Foreign policy has not been the subject of electoral debate. It was the consensus. The phrase you have quoted announces a change in style and methods more than in substance. I remain convinced that, apart from some nuances, the new government is fundamentally committed to the project for Hungary's integration into Western structures.

[Mathil] And your own plans?

[Granasztoi] I am returning to the university, to the history professorship in Hungary. And I will remain in contact with Belgium.

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Parties Protest Zacharski Appointment

LD1608153194 Warsaw Radio Warszawa Network in Polish 1400 GMT 16 Aug 94

[Text] In a statement passed on to PAP, the Conservative Coalition [KK] protests against the appointment of Marian Zacharski to the post of head of the State Protection Office [UOP] intelligence service board. The KK demands that this decision be withdrawn and that the minister responsible for the decision be dismissed.

The Confederation for an Independent Poland regards this appointment as a political provocation.

The Democratic Left Alliance regards the appointment as an independent decision by the UOP head.

More Politicians Comment

WS1708094094 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 17 Aug 94 p 2

[Article by "krzem," "dom": "MSW Advisers Speak Out"]

[Text] GAZETA WYBORCZA has asked two members of the advisory political committee attached to the chief of the Internal Affairs Ministry [MSW]—Zbigniew Siemiatkowski, press spokesman for the Democratic Left Alliance [SLD], and Krzysztof Kozlowski, former MSW chief in the Tadeusz Mazowiecki Cabinet and a member of the Freedom Union [UW]—to comment on the appointment of Major Marian Zacharski as the new chief of civilian intelligence.

Krzysztof Kozlowski (UW):

I do not think Zacharski's appointment is going to spoil Poland's relations with our allies, Krzysztof Kozlowski told GAZETA WYBORCZA. If there were to be any such problems, the appointment would not have occurred in the first place.

Kozlowski was the first noncommunist MSW chief. During his term in office, verification of personnel was carried out in 1990, after which, out of the more than 20,000 officials, just about 7,000 remained. The entire Security Service [SB] was made to leave at that time; all 38 SB generals, among others, were dismissed.

Kozlowski also told us that intelligence and counterintelligence sectors were subjected to the strictest verification procedures: It was a thorough and very comprehensive selection. We came to the conclusion that we just could not deprive the Polish State of these services overnight.

According to the former minister, the fact that MSW services have led to the finalization of the case of Marek Z., a spy who has worked for 10 years for the benefit first of Soviet and then of Russian intelligence, followed by his conviction this year, is proof of the MSW's loyalty toward the Polish Republic [RP].

Kozlowski strongly denies that Zacharski has worked for the KGB: We examined the theme of double agents quite thoroughly, and those people have been far removed from the service, Kozlowski stated. It was the then MSW center that transferred acquired information to the USSR special services.

According to Kozlowski, one should primarily stress professionalism in intelligence and counterintelligence. Of course, one could appoint anybody according to completely arbitrary criteria, but then one cannot be sure of controlling the services. In the case of these services, professionalism is a safety measure, not a risk factor.

Kozlowski also admitted that he would prefer seeing personnel trained in the RP heading the RP's secret services.

He denied that there is a political connotation to the appointments of several "stars" of the secret services of the Polish People's Republic [PRL] to key posts in the Office of State Protection [UOP] and in intelligence: People who are members of Social Democracy of the Polish Republic [an SLD component] and people who served in the MSW before 1989 are not the same thing. One of those who stayed on in the MSW and who succeeded professionally in special services after 1990 told Kozlowski recently: "We are like traitors to them because we joined you people."

SLD Press Spokesman Zbigniew Siemiatkowski:

According to the legal system in force, the decision on Zacharski's appointment did not have to be the subject of consultation with the [MSW] advisory committee, Z. Siemiatkowski told GAZETA WYBORCZA.

The SLD spokesman has trust in UOP Chief Gromoslaw Czempinski and in his personnel decisions.

We need professionals, someone with experience. We failed to train new staff over the past four years. We must wait for that a little longer, Siemiatkowski explained. He is not bothered at all over the fact that more and more high-ranking MSW posts are given to employees of PRL special services.

"Untainted" police officers who have been promoted to high-ranking posts quickly usually had to terminate their careers equally quickly. Take the case of [national police chief] Smolarek or Hula, for instance, the SLD spokesman added.

Asked whether Zacharski's appointment will not be a hurdle for Poland in its contacts with NATO, Siemiatkowski responded by saying that UOP Chief Czempinski must have examined the situation before signing the appointment and that he had considered all the pros and cons. In any event, Polish special services are sovereign, and they do not have to ask the Americans for permission, Zbigniew Siemiatkowski stated.

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Pawlak Departs for Economic Talks in Ukraine

LD1708084794 Warsaw PAP in Polish 0659 GMT 17 Aug 94

[Text] Warsaw, 17 Aug—Prime Minister Waldemar Pawlak has set off for a one-day visit to Ukraine. He will meet Prime Minister Vitaliy Masol in Lutsk. Economic matters will be the main subject of talks.

The prime minister is being accompanied by Deputy Prime Minister Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz, Industry Minister Marek Pol, Foreign Economic Cooperation Minister Leslaw Podkanski, and Agriculture Minister Andrzej Smietanko.

"The visit is essentially of a working nature aimed at reviewing the talks held in the mixed commission so far," the prime minister told journalists before his departure.

The talks will focus on mechanisms to facilitate road and rail transport, the prime minister said. He added that issues related to cooperation within the Carpathian Euroregion and to the Polish community in Ukraine will also be discussed.

"Ukraine is one of the few examples of eastern countries where the amount of business done by Polish companies is increasing," Podkanski said. He added that there are possibilities to increase exports of Polish coal. One of the aims of the visit is to obtain guarantees from the Ukrainian Government for these transactions.

General Staff Spokesman on Army Finances, PFP

WS1708105194 Warsaw TRYBUNA in Polish 17 Aug 94 p 2

[Interview with Lieutenant Colonel Zdzislaw Czekierda, press spokesman of the Polish General Staff, by Aleksander Frydrychowicz; place and date not given: "The Needs Are Great"]

[Text] [Frydrychowicz] The president has promised to increase expenditures on the Army. For what does the Army need the money?

[Czekierda] The Army needs money for practically everything—first for training, which is now only at the elementary level. Because there is not enough money, the number of exercises at the higher echelons of command has been reduced—that is, large-scale exercises, which are the best test of soldiers' knowledge and skills and of the practical knowledge of commanders, have been limited. This is, first of all, where there is not enough money.

However, we also do not have money for investments. The most difficult problem here is the issue of apartments for the professional cadres.

[Frydrychowicz] What about armaments?

[Czekierda] The greater part of the budget the Ministry of National Defense [MON] has at its disposal is earmarked for consumption. These proportions of the expenditures on defense are wrong. We cannot spend much on new equipment, the purchase of new technologies, the modernization of armaments, and on training. The small budget we have has forced us to spoil the proportions in the maintenance of the Army, its modernization and armament. The decisions that are made in this area are always a difficult, often painful, compromise that arises from MON's financial capabilities.

[Frydrychowicz] What sum of money would satisfy the Army?

[Czekierda] The minister of national defense has often said that, with the present financial problems of the state, the Army needs no less than 3 percent of the GDP. It is difficult to speak about amounts of money in zlotys. This depends on state expenditures. There are unofficial opinions that this 3 percent in next year's budget may be in danger.

We believe that the guarantee of such a sum will make it possible to properly shape the proportions of the MON budget and expenditures on the training of soldiers, on their maintenance, on equipment purchases, and on the modernization of armaments.

[Frydrychowicz] The cost of entering NATO is included in that figure?

[Czekierda] I cannot answer that question accurately. There are great gaps between Poland and NATO as far as equipment and technology are concerned. Our equipment is often 30 years old or even older. We definitely have too little ultramodern technology in our Army.

[Frydrychowicz] Will the 3 percent be enough for us to reach the armament level found in NATO?

[Czekierda] No, it will not. It is, however, the minimum level, without which it is impossible to satisfy the most elementary needs related to the security of the state.

[Frydrychowicz] When we were in the Warsaw Pact, the leadership of MON and the General Staff also took part in the staff work of the pact. Is the head of the General Staff of the Polish Army in any way taking part in the staff activities of the "Partnership for Peace" [PFP] program?

[Czekierda] PFP is an idea of a political rather than a military nature. Therefore, it was not the head of the General Staff but, rather, Piotr Kolodziejczyk, minister of national defense, and Jerzy Milewski, first deputy minister of defense, who took part in the present stage of the talks, even though officers of the General Staff prepared the schedule of joint undertakings related to training. I would like to stress that, since the very moment the idea of Poland's participation in the PFP was conceived, the civilian-military leadership of MON has been harmoniously cooperating with the General Staff.

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Returning to your question, I would like to say that, even though the head of the General Staff was not personally involved in the first stage of creating the PFP, he is very interested in putting it into practice. This is proved by the talks he held in early July with General George Joulwan, commander in chief of Joint NATO Forces in Europe.

[Frydrychowicz] Thank you for the interview.

Army Underfunding 'May Delay' NATO Membership

LD1608133894 Warsaw Radio Warszawa Network in Polish 1005 GMT 16 Aug 94

[Text] Referring to yesterday's statement by President Lech Walesa at the Polish Army Day ceremony, in which he expressed concern about the difficult situation of the Army, the guest of today's "Signals of the Day" program, Jerzy Milewski, first deputy minister of national defense, confirmed that the budget funds were insufficient to cover the development and modernization of our Army.

[Begin Milewski recording] The fundamental reason causing the gradual degradation of the Army are the insufficient budget funds. Almost all of the money earmarked by the parliament for the Army is used for survival purposes. There is hardly any investment and hardly any technological modernization that is the modernization of the weaponry. This sounds quite dramatic, although I am far from overdramatizing the situation.

However, if one takes into consideration the fact that the Polish Army should and must serve as a deterrent to potential enemies, but equally also to encourage potential allies, the bad state of our Army and the lack of financial prospects is undoubtedly a very strong negative political factor, which may delay Poland's membership in NATO. [end recording]

Deputy Minister Milewski has also said that there is no direct threat to our country from any direction.

Minister Presents Army Modernization Program

LD1708102394 Warsaw Radio Warszawa Network in Polish 0600 GMT 17 Aug 94

[Text] At yesterday's government meeting, Minister of National Defense Piotr Kolodziejczyk presented a program to modernize the technical equipment of the Polish Army, particularly Polish-made equipment.

[Begin Kolodziejczyk recording] The idea is to plan long-term scientific and research work, as well as work on the development, implementation, and launching of the production of equipment that will be needed in large quantities and whose production would be cost-effective in Poland. The main advantage of such a program would be the stabilization of the situation and an opportunity to plan for the implementation potential for several or even a dozen or so years ahead.

It has been proposed that this plan should cover three specific programs. The first is the Hussar [huzar], a helicopter gunship for our air cavalry divisions. The second program covers air-defense systems—the artillery and missile systems. And the third program concerns the most recent generation of tanks, which could be compared with the best ones in the world, a project code-named Gorilla [goryl].

Many technologies that will be prepared and implemented will have a fast impact on the civilian industry and will improve its technological standards. [end recording]

'Professionalization' of Military Service Urged

WS1608140394 Warsaw POLSKA ZBROJNA in Polish 16 Aug 94 p 4

[Article by Andrzej Medykowski under the "Points of View" rubric: "The Professionalization of the Army"]

[Text] *The Army was a driving force behind progress for centuries, and that state of affairs holds true even now. In many areas, especially in research and implementation and application of technical systems, the Army is the first to receive things that civilians must wait several years or even a decade to get their hands on.*

Still, technology is simply an instrument, while progress applies to man. If one were to assume that an increase in the general development of professional skills is indispensable to contemporary humans, one must admit that it is indispensable in the Army, as well. Professionalization of the Army is a process that is indirectly imposed by civilization-related factors, meaning factors of a more general nature. On the other hand, increases in the general level and professional skills of the personnel of the Armed Forces of a potential enemy have a direct impact on professionalization of the Army.

It is worth speculating, however, as to ways that can be used to achieve a higher level of general and professional preparation. The best way is to train experts at military schools and colleges to meet the needs of the Army. Because of a narrow area of specialization, however, the cost of such training is high, while, given the current economic and social conditions, abandoning one's military career is tantamount to being unemployed. One cannot afford such a step over the next few years, and it seems that the same applies to the little more remote future, as well.

The use of experts trained in civilian schools and colleges is another approach. That is exactly what happens in the case of graduates of schools and colleges that train staff in areas that are useful to both the civilian and the military sectors. In many cases, all that is needed is a short training period, followed by some practice at a given post. Where both sides—that is, the Army and candidates for the military—can see a common interest, a contract can be signed with the prospect of permanent service.

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Still, a professional army is a costly venture, and we will definitely not be able to afford one before 2010. The length of basic military service is getting shorter and shorter (there are plans for 12-month tours). One should take into account that, in extreme cases, soldiers without sufficient incentives will be trying to somehow get through the year, but no more. Under the best scenario, they will learn to operate some uncomplicated equipment, and they will be able to perform certain duties. Servicing sophisticated technology as well as commanding lower-level servicemen should be placed in the hands of experts.

How does one go about procuring such experts? There is a solution: Use the opportunity of performing over-the-time service.

Soldiers who have performed their basic military service, have the appropriate qualifications, and show an interest in continued service can be qualified as capable of doing such over-the-time service. According to the current legal provisions, the length of such service can be between one and four years. Over that time period, they have an opportunity to raise their general and specialist skills, while commencing contract or professional service is an additional prospect awaiting them.

Naturally, over-the-time service is more costly than basic service. If one were to take into account, however, the fact that military hardware would be in good hands over those few years (and would be utilized properly), whereas the technology's level of breakdowns would go down substantially while training tasks would be performed at a higher level, the gains from the introduction of such a service scheme seem obvious.

PSL 'Opposition' Calls on Separation of Party

WS1608115294 Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish 16 Aug 94 p 4

[Article by IGO, POZ: "Pawlak in Three Persons"]

[Text] *During Saturday's session by the Chief Council of the Polish Peasant Party [PSL], some party activists (like Janusz Piechocinski, for instance) called on separating party posts from state ones. Piechocinski's view is that otherwise "the disputes will get worse, whereas the PSL will continue to drift." Jozef Zych has the biggest chance for PSL support in the presidential elections.*

Prime Minister Waldemar Pawlak is satisfied with the results of the self-government elections. Those peasant activists, however, who gladly engage in criticizing various moves by party leadership, like Janusz Piechocinski and Roman Jagielinski, are of the view that the election results could have been better.

Their view is that the reasons have to do with the fact that many leading party politicians have begun working for the government. Pawlak himself holds three posts: government chief, party chief, and parliamentary club chief. PSL supreme authorities also include Michal Strak, chief of the Office of the Council of Ministers, and some ministers.

"Unless Pawlak finds trustworthy people to be in charge of the party and the club, the disputes will get worse, and the party will continue to drift," Sejm Deputy Piechocinski argues. The prime minister, however, has a different view. He cites the examples of England and the FRG, where government chiefs are chairmen of their parties at the same time.

The so-called opposition inside the PSL is not a group that would have a coherent program of action. The main common trait of "the oppositionists" is a tendency to point to political and personnel mistakes in the prime minister's surroundings.

When it comes to specific issues, their positions vary. Jagelinski, for instance, demanded during a budget debate that the interests of rural areas and agriculture be taken into account to a greater extent. Jacek Soska demanded the same in an even more radical way. On the other hand, Piechocinski gladly emphasizes that the PSL is not a strictly rural party but an "all-national" one. During the conflict between Pawlak and that part of the government that comes from the Democratic Left Alliance, which ended in Marek Borowski's departure, Piechocinski made appeals toward reconciliation because "the voters don't like it when the authorities argue among themselves."

The presidency issue has not yet become a subject of confrontation. The peasant activists debated it during the council's session, but no decisions were made. Many PSL politicians feel positively about Jozef Zych, deputy Sejm speaker and chairman of the Chief Council. There is unofficial talk that, when it comes to Pawlak himself, he does not want to take the chance of fighting for the Belweder because, if he were to lose, that would mean saying good-bye to the prime-ministerial post. Pawlak himself indicated on several occasions that he will not run. Senate Speaker Adam Struzik is another politician whose candidacy is being considered.

The PSL will have its own press spokesman—Pawel Popiak, editor in chief of ZIELONY SZTANDAR. He was mentioned earlier as a candidate first for chief of the Government Press Office and then for PAP chief.

Inflation, Budget Deficit, Central Bank's Role

WS1608115894 Warsaw NOWA EUROPA in Polish 16 Aug 94 p 1

[Article by P.S.: "How Does One Reduce Inflation to 16 Percent? NBP Opposed to Radical Increases of Financing of Budget Deficit in 1995"]

[Text] A substantial reduction of interest rates, forecast in governmental budget assumptions for 1995, has not been accepted by the central bank yet. The level of

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interest rates will depend on the overall economic situation, inflation, the level of foreign currency reserves, and many other factors, Witold Kozinski, first deputy chairman of the Polish National Bank [NBP], told NOWA EUROPA.

It would be hard to assume that the forecasts will come true, especially given that the NBP has not yet accepted the 16-percent inflation level that is being planned for next year. For us to be able to take a position on this proposal, we need information on the level at which the NBP is financing the budget deficit, Kozinski says. The information is not included in the budget assumptions for 1995. This kind of deficit financing incites inflation very strongly, so, depending on its level, one will be able to calculate the inflation rate with a high degree of likelihood. It is not an issue of adopting a certain inflation path, of a decision, or political will. It is an issue of compiling a balance of NBP expenditures and revenue, projection of a collective balance for all banks, and of next year's foreign trade turnover. If we assume 16-percent inflation, and if we then fail to achieve this undoubtedly correct goal, that would not be rational action on our part.

According to Kozinski, from the NBP's standpoint, an increase in the financing of the budget deficit by 10-15 trillion zlotys [Z] compared with 1994 would be a satisfactory level of financing the budget deficit. In that case, a 16-percent inflation level would become an ambitious but achievable goal. Still, the budget assumptions provide that the amount of profit paid by the NBP into the budget is Z40 trillion. If the central bank were not to finance the budget at all, the amount would be about Z23 trillion. The financing of a Z10-trillion budget deficit results in a Z1-trillion increase of profit. So the amount of Z40 trillion that is being planned by the finance minister means an enormous increase in the financing of the budget deficit. We debated the issue twice during Council of Ministers sessions, and our partners know what it means. This year, inflation will definitely reach the 27-to-28-percent level, so to speak of 16 percent next year is unrealistic. If our proposals get approved, we will undertake measures making it possible to reach the goal. However, we can see some questions emerging that prevent one from thinking realistically about 16-percent inflation next year.

Promotion of 'Small Business' Urged

MM1708090594 Katowice TRYBUNA SLASKA in Polish 10 Aug 94 p 4

[Interview with Professor Marian Ostrowski of the Institute of Development and Strategic Studies in Warsaw by correspondent Zbigniew Weglarek; place and date not given]

[Text] [Weglarek] In the "Strategy For Poland" document, emphasis is placed, among other things, on boosting tax revenues through the absorption of the so-called gray zone into the legal economy and increasing the base tax as opposed to the taxation rate. What do you say to that?

[Ostrowski] I endorse the intentions of the authors of "Strategy for Poland." It cannot be that 20-30 percent of economic turnover is accounted for by people and economic entities that refuse to accept full responsibility both for contributing to the running of the state, the parish, and so on, and for the consequences of their participation in market operations. The "gray zone" infringes consumers' rights. For example, it is difficult to claim your rights to compensation for faulty, inferior-quality, time-expired, or unsafe goods from illegal traders or manufacturers or to make such unauthorized purveyors legally accountable.

The existence of the "gray zone" is also conducive to an intensification of pathological and, indeed, criminal phenomena. The illegal channels it creates opens the way for the "seepage" onto the market of goods of criminal provenance (burglary, theft, contraband, and so on). Moreover, the "unofficial" economy exacerbates social problems. Although it is true that it helps to reduce the extent of unemployment (the "gray zone" gives regular employment to 300,000 people and occasional employment to further hundreds of thousands), those working in "black economy" jobs do not enjoy even the most elementary social protection against sickness or disability, are not eligible for old-age pensions, and so on.

[Weglarek] But it is rather worrying that the authors of the government program place major emphasis predominantly on the fiscal aspects of the question.

[Ostrowski] If one-third of all who participate in the market economy fail to pay their taxes, the financial liabilities of the "official economy" must increase. However, I believe that the most important thing is to view the present unofficial economy as an important flywheel of economic activity. In a country undergoing such a profound transformation from a centralized to a market economy, the "gray zone" should be approached differently from the way it is in countries with a stable and fully mature economy. The majority of people embarking on independent economic activity have neither the experience nor sufficient resources to instantly enter the world of big business. "Small business," which dominates the "gray zone" today, needs to be both "made civilized" and given protection from the state and local authorities alike. It should not be viewed exclusively in terms of budgetary reserve.

[Weglarek] So should we shut our eyes to the existence of the "gray zone"?

[Ostrowski] I am not suggesting that we do. However, I believe that those who embark on their first independent ventures in the field of business should have their initial steps made easy rather than difficult. You cannot immediately "strangle" those individuals who are only beginning to put sufficient funds together to be able to build

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economic independence with the same liabilities in respect of the state or the parish as you would entrepreneurs who already operate with large capital and have secured a sure footing in the market. As for those who have managed to move beyond the difficult beginnings and the most basic forms of business ventures, we should give them incentives and opportunities so that they can become full-fledged businessmen.

[Weglarek] How?

[Ostrowski] Not by showering them with preferential terms and privileges but by affording them greater security of operations: stable economic conditions, contract protection, a credible and reliable banking system, and so on. At present, the lack of all these provisions impels many entrepreneurs to enter the "gray zone," even though they are by no means novices or people lacking sound capital resources and could even now be creating a real "business world" here, similar to those existing in other, more economically advanced countries.

Crime, Police Corruption, Legal System Viewed

WS1708113094 Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish 17 Aug 94 p 2

[Commentary by philosopher and journalist Ryszard Legutko under the "Points of View" rubric: "From Three Perspectives"]

[Text] *So far, the race between criminals and the justice system over who will take better advantage of the conditions created by the new political and economic situation is being very clearly won by the criminal world.*

The rise in crime rates, especially the emergence of organized crime on a perceivable scale, has become the main topic of debate in the press and in television over the past few weeks. Moreover, there is nothing to indicate that this is some kind of summertime sensation seeking. The mass media, politicians, and opinion-shaping groups are all in agreement that we are dealing with a serious problem that requires taking a serious stand. One could note incidentally that a far-reaching agreement like this is something relatively new. Up until recently, a trend existed to play down the magnitude of different phenomena and to minimize the impact of crime by saying it is just an unavoidable effect of the sociopolitical situation and the new legal and political regime.

There are three main perspectives or areas of interest here. Police corruption as well as corruption found in other state agencies that have been charged with executing law and order is the first one. The issue is delicate and difficult to write about. By definition, we do not have sufficient information in the area, and we are doomed to go by gossip alone. One can draw a reasonable conclusion, however, based on facts that have been confirmed, that possible corruption does not seem to be spread across the entire system, and it is definitely not the main reason for inefficiency in fighting crime. There are many facts, however, whose interpretation is ambiguous and that must raise concern. Take, for instance, the fact of releasing suspects on ridiculously low bails or even without any bail, and I mean suspects with regard to which there is justified suspicion that they are members of criminal organizations. It is not possible to decide in the abstract whether in each case like that we are dealing with corruption or perhaps with zealousness, which should be applauded, in observing the letter of the law. What is important, however, is that we are witnessing an amazing phenomenon here: Representatives of our legal system do not seem to care at all about what the majority of their Western colleagues try to avoid at all cost: creating opportunities that could give rise to suspicion of corruption. To put it in other words, representatives of our legal system seem—or at least they seemed until recently—not to care about their social perception, which could mean that the perception in question has no bearing at all on their occupational position.

The second area of interest is made up of the efficiency of the police, the public prosecutor's office, and the remaining state agencies involved in combating the crime phenomenon. It seems that this is the area where the number of unaccomplished tasks is the biggest. Most of what is commonly interpreted as being a result of ill will, corruption, or political "schemes" is really a result of inefficiency and internal weakness being displayed by the police, the public prosecutor's office, State Treasury agencies, and so forth. The legacy of the Polish People's Republic continues to be present in these structures, whereas habits that had been formed in a static society and in a system of bureaucratic accounting for one's own efficiency turn out to be completely useless under the new situation. Organized crime is a form of free, albeit degenerated, entrepreneurship, and that is why it has flourished in the new system as dynamically as privately owned trade. Structures charged with combating crime, on the other hand, are by definition plagued by sluggishness and bureaucratic manners, they like to drag their feet a lot, and they are attached to old ways of doing things.

So far, the race taking place between criminals and the justice system about who will take better advantage of the conditions created by the new system is being very clearly won by the criminal world. After the recent issue of the Mafia, which gained much publicity, police representatives and their bosses issued a number of tough-sounding statements, and there were several shows of force here and there, as well as a few apprehensions, but it is not clear so far whether we are dealing with a spontaneous reaction imposed by social moods, with immediate measures that conceal the official impotence, or with the beginning of some form of clear-cut and long-term measures. Opinions aired by officials of the Internal Affairs Ministry that crime rates in Poland are not as high as those in other countries should not be encouragement for anybody, most of all, the officials themselves, to feel complacent. That is because crime in

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general is characterized by a clearly growing trend, especially in countries with a legal system that has not been stabilized yet and with weak law and order agencies. The same danger applies to corruption.

Changes in the legal system that would allow an increase in the efficiency of prosecuting crime is the third area of interest being discussed here. There is much talk in particular about the role of witnesses and about the lack of adequate protection for witnesses under the current legal situation. That is why witnesses are unwilling to cooperate with the police. All that is true, and necessary changes should be introduced as soon as possible. It is worth noting, however, that the willingness of witnesses to cooperate with the police, the public prosecutor's office, or State Treasury agencies is also dependent to a large extent on the degree of trust society has in these institutions. Even with the best possible legal solutions, witnesses may continue to be unwilling to give testimony that would incriminate gangsters, if the common perception is that state agencies are weak and inefficient and officials are clumsy and arrogant, whereas suspicion of corruption continues to be the people's first reaction when they read in the press about more successes by the criminal world.

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CSCE Official Examines Ethnic Minority Issue

AU1708080094 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1700 GMT 16 Aug 94

[Text] Mr. Max van der Stoel, CSCE high commissioner for ethnic minorities, arrived in Romania yesterday, 15 August, at the invitation of Foreign Minister Teodor Melescanu. Today, the guest held talks in Cluj-Napoca.

Our correspondent Teodor Mateescu informed us that successive meetings were held at the Cluj County Prefect's Office and at the headquarters of the UDMR [Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania], the German Democratic Forum, and the Free Democratic Union of Romanies.

On this visit, Mr. Max van der Stoel was accompanied by Ivan Trutar, secretary of the Council for National Minorities, and Mr. Ion Opris, general director in the Ministry of Culture.

During the dialogue held at the Prefect's Office with the leadership of that office and the leadership of the County Council, the Mayor's office, and the Culture, Education, and Police Inspectorates, the guest asked the local authorities to comment on the information that the state of tension in relations with the Hungarian minority is increasing continuously in Cluj as well as in other counties of Romania. The answer of the authorities was that such information is groundless at the level of the general population, however, such information is circulated maliciously by certain UDMR leaders. Mr. Max van der Stoel also wished to assure the officials present at the meeting that he does not show special sensitivity toward the problems of the Hungarian minority through his mandate and that he does not intend to become the advocate of any of the sides at the CSCE. His mission is solely to represent a body that is founded on unanimously recognized documents and principles regarding respect for human rights and the rights of minorities to cultural and spiritual identity.

During the meeting with the representatives of the executive leadership of the UDMR, Mr. Max van der Stoel was told about their grievances and their dissatisfaction with the activity of the Council of Ethnic Minorities, with the draft law on education—which is currently being discussed by parliament—with the faulty functioning of the local administration—obstructed by government decisions—and with the process of returning nationalized dwellings to their owners. The UDMR representatives also presented Mr. Max van der Stoel with two video cassettes showing the beginning of the archaeological excavation works in the center of Cluj and the removal of bilingual signs in Mures County upon the orders of the Prefect's Office.

The representatives of the German Democratic Forum complained about the activity of the Court of Accounts in Cluj and about attempts to transfer the Forum's headquarters. However, the contribution of this ethnic minority and its role in establishing normal relations of co-habitation with the majority population were also revealed.

The issues approached at the Free Democratic Union of Romanies generally referred to the difficulties encountered by this ethnic minority in social and professional integration and the complex nature of this minority's life within the general framework of Romanian society. Nevertheless, it was noted that visible efforts are being made to improve this state of affairs.

Mr. Max van der Stoel will return to Bucharest this evening. Tomorrow, his schedule includes meetings with government representatives, our correspondent informed us.

PUNR President's Warning

AU1708080194 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1700 GMT 16 Aug 94

[Text] Our editorial office has received a communique signed by Gheorghe Funar, the president of the PUNR [National Romanian Unity Party]. The communique reads as follows:

Today, 16 August, at the Cluj County Prefect's Office in Cluj, CSCE High Commissioner Mr. Max van der Stoel held talks with the president of the County Council and the prefect of Cluj County, the mayor of Cluj Napoca Municipality, and leaders of certain museums and cultural institutions in Cluj Napoca Municipality.

On this occasion, the CSCE high commissioner mentioned that he came to Cluj Napoca as a result of media reports about possible interethnic conflicts provoked by archaeological excavations in Cluj Union Square and the sensitivity of the Hungarian minority.

In his address, the mayor of the Cluj Napoca Municipality expressed his regret about the fact that the CSCE high commissioner, a professional diplomat, allowed himself to be misled by the UDMR [Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania] and agreed to accommodate the illegal demands of this ethnic party. The PUNR president also stressed that the goals of the actions of disinformation carried out by the UDMR are to discredit Romania as well as those European bodies to whom they turn, the communique reads.

Mr. Gheorghe Funar asked the CSCE high commissioner to suggest that the Romanian Government and the Romanian Parliament, as well as the CSCE and the Council of Europe, adopt sanctions against the UDMR for a lack of loyalty to Romania and for misleading European bodies.

Likewise, the CSCE high commissioner was warned not to become involved in Romania's parliamentary activity in connection with the endorsement of the education law and not to support the demands of the UDMR regarding education and instruction in the Hungarian language at

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any level, the communique sent to our editorial office by PUNR President Gheorghe Funar reads.

Ethnic Hungarian Treaty Consultation Planned

LD1608214094 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 2000 GMT 16 Aug 94

[Text] From now on the Romanian Government is willing to enter into consultation with the Hungarian Democratic Union of Romania [HDUR] concerning the Hungarian-Romanian basic treaty, which is under preparation. This transpired from a discussion between HDUR Chairman Bela Marko and Romanian Foreign Minister Teodor Melescanu. Tibor Bogdan reports from Bucharest.

[Bogdan] The Romanian Foreign Ministry seems to be willing to consult the HDUR on the issue of the Romanian-Hungarian basic treaty in preparation. This was stated in a concrete manner today at a one-hour discussion between Foreign Minister Melescanu and Marko, which came about at the request of the HDUR chairman.

In reply to a question from the Hungarian Radio correspondent, Marko said that first and foremost he wanted to meet the foreign minister so that they could review several burning issues of the Hungarian community in Romania. Since these issues are related to the recommendations of the Council of Europe, they can be considered foreign affairs issues.

On the other hand, since the HDUR leaders have already consulted the Hungarian Government on the basic treaty, the necessity of a similar discussion with the Romanian Government's representatives about the basic treaty chapters that have a direct effect on the ethnic Hungarians of Romania, came as natural.

After Foreign Minister Melescanu repeatedly gave his consent in principle at the discussion this afternoon, the sides were able to agree on the bringing about of a discussion of this kind. In accordance with this, a consultation is expected to be held in the next fortnight between competent representatives of the HDUR and the Romanian Foreign Ministry, HDUR chairman Marko told the Hungarian Radio correspondent.

Iliescu's Condition Reportedly 'Very Good'

AU1708105594 Bucharest EVENIMENTUL ZILEI in Romanian 11 Aug 94 p 1

[Article by Aba Masoni: "President Ion Iliescu's Post-Surgery Recovery Is Very Good"]

[Text] After the acute gallbladder surgery he underwent on 21 July 1994, Romanian President Ion Iliescu returned to Elias Hospital for a routine checkup on the evening of 9 August.

According to sources close to the president, after the checkup, which was carried out by the same physicians who performed the surgery, the physicians noted that Ion Iliescu's post-surgery recovery is very good, thus, he will be able to resume his activity soon. The same sources mentioned that Ion Iliescu has no other health problems and this was also confirmed by the results of the tests he underwent at Elias Hospital.

PSM's Verdet Predicts Government Reshuffle

AU1608113794 Bucharest CURIERUL NATIONAL in Romanian 8 Aug 94 p 3

[Interview with Ilie Verdet, president of the Socialist Party of Labor, PSM, by Dan Ioan Sovar; place and date not given: "I Do Not Believe That Romania Necessarily Has To Be Led by a Political Class"]

[Text] [Sovar] Do you believe that the press reflects political life in Romania objectively?

[Verdet] It is obvious that the press reflects the situation in accordance with interests of its own and views facts from a certain angle. It also stresses certain aspects that cannot be perceived through a direct approach.

[Sovar] In your opinion, which newspapers are worth reading today?

[Verdet] All those that make an effort to inform the public about all events that are taking place in Romania and in the international arena. Only those are the most valued and required newspapers in Romania.

[Sovar] Who are the political commentators that you prefer?

[Verdet] I do not have a special preference. I read all commentaries and I watch all commentators on television. It is difficult to decide whom you like. However, I prefer those who write more comprehensive commentaries and give more complete information to people. I believe that the ideas that I express are correct, but this only represents my loyalty to a credo. Talking about this branch, I can say that we have valuable people who strive to be objective, but this idea of objectivity will be always relative, just like in the case of people.

[Sovar] What is the latest political book you have read?

[Verdet] I have read very many and I do not know what you consider political books. To tell you the truth, not many valuable political books have been published lately. People have taken too much refuge in history. I believe that one of our big mistakes is that we waste time and do not pay adequate attention to past events, although there are several distinctive periods in history that should be examined seriously, such as the period of emergence from World War II or even the post-December [1989] period. All this makes us reach too few conclusions in connection with the present but mainly the future of the country. I do not deny the need to clarify history; on the contrary. A nation that does not know its own history is lost and is without prospects. And I have to note with greatest regret that many

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politicians have forgotten their duty, namely to concentrate on the issues connected with the future of our nation. I have not seen any outstanding book on political issues. Even if some party documents are interesting in the way they express political beliefs, they cannot be considered political documents.

[Sovar] Which political authors you prefer?

[Verdet] I do not really see any Romanian as a political author although I would be interested. There are many foreign political authors for each person's taste and understanding.

[Sovar] What does political education mean to you?

[Verdet] First of all basically to understand social and political phenomena, the construction of society, and democracy. It also means a correct attitude toward conditions that allow for the progress of political life. It means political pluralism, mutual respect, and, ultimately, a broader education, not only in the political field but in all areas of activity, which can ensure the capacity for a universal approach to all issues. Certainly, we need a greater patience in order to ensure a really democratic life.

[Sovar] Could you assess the level of political education of the Romanian political class?

[Verdet] I have a slightly different opinion here. I do not believe that Romania necessarily has to be led by a political class and therefore I do not understand how one could define such a political class. The term political class, that is, the class of politicians, is incorrect or insufficiently defined. Policy is not an asset only of a certain social strata but of the whole nation. Each person has to have this asset and one cannot formulate a political thesis without taking into account the tendencies that the country's people express at a certain time. This is the meaning of democracy in a state, in addition to the confrontation at ballots, where the truth is decided upon for one period or another in the life of a country.

[Sovar] What are you going to do during the holiday?

[Verdet] I want to undergo some treatment for my rheumatism and then to rest.

[Sovar] How do you view the activity of the parliament?

[Verdet] Basically I am not siding with those who only use negative qualifiers, rejecting absolutely everything. There has also been some positive activity in the parliament, which has been beneficial for the country. However, on the whole, the parliament's activity is much below expectations. More than two-thirds of our parliamentary life has been oratorical, and included sterile discussions and unproductive confrontations. It is a pity that many people do not understand what democracy means, that is, not obstructionism but the joint advance toward a constructive activity. I cannot say that the country enjoys such an activity currently. The right wing, in all its forms and without room for argument, imposes its "duty" to be against every progress and to break every progress, while the parties that are members of the pentagonal coalition often wish—but through hasty measures and without publicizing their intentions—to find solutions to certain problems. Some parliamentarians show a great lack of patience and understanding but also of political education.

[Sovar] What do you consider to be the most marked political event this autumn?

[Verdet] I believe that the most marked event will be the start of the parliamentary activity, which will open with an extraordinary session at a time when it is important to define the position of the right wing—considering that one can notice increasingly frequent turmoil among the right-wing factions—but also to clarify the position of the center left wing, headed by the PDSR [Social Democracy Party of Romania].

[Sovar] Do you believe that there will be a government reshuffle?

[Verdet] I believe so, because this is necessary when one considers how much criticism has been voiced about the activity of certain government departments and ministries and also about certain members of the current leadership. This does not necessarily have to be an impediment of the right wing or a no-confidence vote. It is a requirement for the appropriate unfolding of our activity and for the appropriate fulfillment of our goals, through the reshuffle. The government must think this over.

[Sovar] Can you name a government team that would be ideal for the current situation of our country?

[Verdet] Not for the moment. But I could tell you if the socialists were representing the majority.

[Sovar] Who do you envisage as prime minister of the country if Mr. Vacaroiu were replaced?

[Verdet] You have to ask the PDSR leadership this question. In any event, I do not think this is currently topical. And if this issue becomes topical, it is still the PDSR that has the decisive say in it. They have enough cadres but I do not see any reason why the government would have to be changed.

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UN Reports Serbs Violating Exclusion Zone

AU1608194894 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 16 Aug 94

[Text] Over the last 24 hours UN military observers have registered 684 violations of the cease-fire in the Sarajevo region. This was stated today by Major Rob Annink, UN spokesman in Sarajevo. The violations were mostly automatic weapons fire.

The UN military observers have also registered 12 explosions in Dobrinja and one in Sedrenik, but they have no reliable information as to what caused them.

One chetnik T-55 tank has been observed moving from Vrace to Kovacici, which is in clear violation of the agreement on the exclusion of heavy artillery from Sarajevo, Major Annink said. The only thing that UNPROFOR [UN Protection Forces] plans to do this time is to lodge a protest note with the aggressor's military command.

One of the aggressor's modern M-84 tanks [as heard] is still positioned in Ilijas. It, too, is not under UNPROFOR control.

Serb Military Leaders Oppose Peace Plan

AU1608151794 Paris AFP in English 1448 GMT 16 Aug 94

[Text] Belgrade, Aug 16 (AFP)—Bosnian Serb army chief of staff General Milan Gvero on Tuesday [16 August] called on Serb separatists to fight an international peace plan for Bosnia because it deprives Serbs of their rights.

"A resolute and just struggle is the only logical response" to the peace plan which "deprives Serbs of their rights," Gvero said in a statement on Bosnian Serb television, carried Tuesday by the Belgrade newspaper BORBA.

If Serbs accepted the blueprint, territories they hold would have to be returned, which would lead to an "easy breakup" of the self-styled Serb republic in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Gvero's stand is in line with statements by the separatist Serb political leadership.

Momcilo Krajisnik, speaker of the Serbs' self-styled parliament, meanwhile said Tuesday the commander of the Bosnian Serb forces, General Ratko Mladic, had voiced clear support for the Serb leadership, BETA news agency here reported.

Statements by Gvero and Krajisnik follow press reports that Mladic had so far failed to take a public stand on the peace plan submitted by an international contact group.

Under the peace plan the Serbs who now control 70 percent of Bosnia-Herzegovina would be given 49 percent, with the Moslem-Croat federation getting the remainder.

The Serb assembly will meet Thursday to discuss latest developments and name a new "government" two weeks after Belgrade—under a UN embargo for its support for the Bosnian Serbs—said it would cut all ties with the separatists.

Annink Protests Serb 'Blackmail,' Sniping

AU1708115394 Paris AFP in English 1132 GMT 17 Aug 94

[Text] Sarajevo, Aug 17 (AFP)—Bosnian Serbs have warned that UN convoys will no longer be allowed in Serb-held zones unless they first provide Serb forces with badly needed fuel, UN officials said.

Major Rob Annink, a spokesman with the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR), described the Serb threat, due to come into effect Thursday, as "blackmail."

"We will not comply," he said.

The demand was made in a letter sent to UN officials by Serb military officials. Annink said UNPROFOR's civilian coordinator, Victor Andreev, had been sent to Serb headquarters in Pale near here to protest.

The Serb forces have been suffering from fuel shortages since neighboring Serbia closed the border with the self-proclaimed Bosnian Serb republic as punishment for the Bosnian Serbs rejection of an international plan to end the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Annink also acknowledged that snipers remained active in Sarajevo despite earlier UN statements that an agreement Sunday by both Serbs and the Bosnian Moslems to halt sniper in the capital activity was being respected.

"I do not deny that sniping has been going on," he said, but added that no one had been wounded since Sunday's agreement and argued that more time was needed to judge the effectiveness of the deal.

UN Reports 86 Bosnians Expelled From Bijeljina

AU1608195094 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 16 Aug 94

[Text] Yesterday 86 Bosniaks were expelled from Bijeljina, among them 19 children. This was confirmed at today's news conference in the Sarajevo headquarters of the UN Protection Force [UNPROFOR]. Reporters were told that the latest expulsion of Bosniaks was led by a major in the aggressor's army, Vojkan Djurisic. One elderly Bosniak died during the expulsion. All those expelled were forced to pay 100 German marks each, and UNPROFOR suspects that the chetniks also robbed them of their jewelry.

Serbs Move Tanks to Brcko Front, Shell Travnik

AU1608190194

[Editorial Report] Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian at 1700 GMT on 16 August carries in a 30-minute newscast several reports on the fighting in the republic.

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Mirza Sadikovic reports from Bihac that "the chetniks have been using artillery on the Buzim and Bihac fronts, where they have been firing 60-mm and 82-mm mortars. As for the Grmusko-Srbljanski plateau, they have maintained their sporadic fire using antiaircraft weapons and snipers. The situation is again difficult along the demarcation line facing the rebel groups of war criminal Fikret Abdic. They have dug in at [words indistinct], and have been firing their artillery. Abdic has had his chaotic army set up vital defenses around Velika Kladusa by inventing the existence of guns and artillery in the so-called Serbian autonomous region of Krajina. His forcefully mobilized and demoralized paramilitary forces obviously do not want to continue to die in vain, and there is justified fear that Abdic might—in a desperate attempt to save his own skin—destroy Velika Kladusa itself with the help of the chetniks. He has again been arresting and expelling all those who favor peace. After torturing them, last night he expelled 65 people from [word indistinct] from the Cazin Commune, who had publicly called for an end to the conflict."

Reporting from Brcko, Hamiz Deronjic says that "as over the last few days, our positions on the central part of the front have been exposed to the heaviest fire—the aggressor fired mortars and used machine guns and Bofors guns from Brod. Heavy fire has been reported from the direction of Gaj Suma, with the enemy firing an antiaircraft gun at Djukici. Today the aggressor again regrouped on the Brcko front: The arrival of enemy tanks has been reported in the area of Cadjavac and Sumari, while the chetniks have also been deploying additional artillery in Omerbegovaca."

Reporting from the theater of operations of the 7th South Operative Group, Mirudin Aldobasic says that "after unsuccessful attempts to infiltrate sabotage groups on the Tesanj and Doboj fronts and after suffering considerable losses, the chetniks have still not fallen silent."

Razija Mehic reports from the theater of operations of the 7th Corps that "apart from artillery fire, the chetniks on the Vlasic plateau have attempted several infantry breakthroughs. After the usual failure of these, the chetniks again shelled civilian targets. On two occasions, at 1330 and 1440, they fired several howitzer shells at Travnik from their well-known stronghold of (Sesicka Planina). The citizens of Travnik—being used to the chetniks' tactics—had gone into their shelters as soon as the general alarm was sounded, so there were no casualties in today's shelling." She says that "a POW exchange was supposed to take place today, but it was postponed because of the chetnik artillery fire."

The studio announcer says that "this morning the chetniks used small arms on the Zvornik front and in the afternoon switched to artillery. A T-55 tank in Androvici was firing at Vitinica."

He cites the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army 1st Corps Press Center that "throughout the day the aggressor has continued to violate the agreement signed on the cessation of sniper activity in Sarajevo. From their barracks in Rajlovac, chetnik snipers fired at Rogatica Street, from Tri Hrasta at the defense lines on the side of Mijatovica, and from [word indistinct] at Hotonj. The intense small arms fire is unabated along the entire demarcation line around Sarajevo." He says that "the chetniks have been carrying out engineering work in the Bare area, digging in their artillery."

Serb Attacks Reported at Brcko, Doboj, Sarajevo

AU1708092394

[Editorial Report] Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian at 0800 GMT on 17 August reports overnight fighting in the following regions:

Reporting from "the free Brcko territory," Hamiz Deronjic says that "the enemy last night intensified artillery attacks on Donja Brka, while he pounded the region of Poljaki, Jagodnjak, and (?Bubanj) with 60-mm and 62-mm mortars, supported by fire from antiaircraft machine guns and antiaircraft guns." As Deronjic continues to report, "the aggressor continued the regrouping he had started during the day. We have noted the movement of enemy tanks in the central part of Brcko's battlefield and, in the course of the night, enemy transport helicopters overflew Brcko on two occasions."

Correspondent Mujic reports from the Press Center Doboj-East that "the night on Doboj battlefield did not pass without enemy artillery attacks. The Mount Ozren chetniks attacked Glokotnica and [words indistinct] and afterward from the region of [word indistinct] attacked the settled part of Glokotici from 82-mm mortars." As he reports, the Serbs also attacked the Doboj-Gracanica road with a Bofors and a Browning gun last night. The enemy exhibited provocative fire from infantry and antiaircraft arms along the entire defense line. Mujic reports that one civilian was killed and two injured in the shelling, however, as he adds, "the lines of defense of the 109th Hill Brigade Doboj remain firm and stable."

"Beside fire from antiaircraft arms, the enemy has been firing grenades from a portable launcher and throwing hand grenades along the entire line of separation on the Sarajevo battlefield last night," the Information Service of the 1st Corps reports.

Muslim Troops Redeployed Through Airport Tunnel

LD1608134994 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1203 GMT 16 Aug 94

[Excerpts] Zvornik, Bratunac, 16 Aug (TANJUG)—In addition to an increasing number of stepped up attacks against the Srpska republic on many fronts, Muslim units are also regrouping. This confirms earlier reports about their preparations for a new major offensive, TANJUG learned from sources close to the leadership of the Srpska republic's army.

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According to these sources, the Muslim army has been abusing the February agreement on the removal of heavy weapons from the 20-km exclusion-zone around Sarajevo and the Serb side's earlier consent for UNPROFOR [UN Protection Forces] troops to replace Serb forces in the Igman and Bjelasnica areas.

Muslim units previously deployed in the areas mentioned above have been moving to other areas where new offensives against the Srpska republic are being prepared and carried out, Serb military sources explain.

Thousands of Muslim troops and large amounts of weapons, ammunition, and military equipment have been transferred through or under Sarajevo airport. Heavy weapons have also been transferred even though the Muslim side was supposed to put them under UNPROFOR control in February.

According to Srpska republic army sources, during the night of 12-13 August, 300 Muslim soldiers went through the tunnel under the Sarajevo airport to Visoko via Igman and Kiseljak in order to strengthen the forces facing the Serb defense positions on the Nisici plateau and Ilijas.

A strong Muslim offensive has been going on in this area for more than ten days, partly inside the 20-km exclusion zone around Sarajevo. Official UNPROFOR representatives have also publicly expressed their concern about this on several occasions. [passage omitted]

Serb military sources claim that the Muslim forces "suffered considerable losses in their offensive [northeast of Sarajevo], not only in manpower but also in combat equipment," and that at the end of last week the bodies of 96 Muslim soldiers killed in the Breza and Vares war zones were returned to Sarajevo under the airport runway.

According to Serb sources, the Muslim leadership is directly responsible for their deaths because "its stubborn determination to continue the war at any cost is being paid for with the lives of their innocent compatriots."

Akashi Demands Bosnian Army Halt Offensive

AU1608152594 Paris AFP in English 1506 GMT 16 Aug 94

[Excerpts] Sarajevo, Aug 16 (AFP)—UN Special Envoy Yasushi Akashi came to Sarajevo Tuesday [16 August] to demand an end to the mainly Moslem Bosnian Army's offensive against the rebel Serbs, which he said could undermine ongoing peace efforts. [passage omitted]

"We expect progress step by step," Akashi said after talks with government officials. "Of course we would like to have rapid, radical progress but when that cannot be expected we want nevertheless to achieve small steps but in forward direction not backward."

Before entering meetings with Ejup Ganic, a member of the collective Bosnian presidency, and minister for UN relations Hasan Muratovic, Akashi told journalists the United Nations was "opposed to any offensive actions by any side" in the fighting.

"We are quite concerned (about the threat to peace efforts) and we are going to discuss the question of military stabilisation measures," he added.

The visit comes after two weeks of government army pressure on the separatist Serbs, supported by their new Croat allies in the Bosnian Federation and Croatian forces from Zagreb.

Despite efforts to date by the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Bosnia, the Sarajevo government has so far not signalled an end to the operation which marks its first success for some time against Serb forces, which now control 70 percent of the former Yugoslav republic. [passage omitted]

"We should not lower our guard to continued Serb aggression," Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic explained in an interview with the Sarajevo daily OSLOBODJENJE, published Tuesday.

He accused the Serbs of preparing to use chemical weapons and said military supplies were still getting through to them from Serbia, despite Belgrade's stated embargo on its former old allies. [passage omitted]

Army Chief Delic Calls For 'Fresh Combat'

AU1708075894 Paris AFP in English 2145 GMT 16 Aug 94

[Article by Jacques Charmelot]

[Text] Sarajevo, Aug 16 (AFP)—Bosnian Army chief General Rasim Delic urged his troops Tuesday to brace for fresh combat, calling for an acceleration in action to retake land from the Bosnian Serbs.

"I am asking my soldiers to think about how they will go further into the struggle if it is necessary and it seems that it will be necessary," Delic said. "We ask everybody to realize that the war still continues."

Listing recent gains by his Moslem-led army in retaking land seized by the Serbs, he said: "The process of liberation should accelerate... in recent times the successes of the Bosnian Army are beyond little tactical successes."

He was speaking in a television appearance after a day in which UN envoy Yasushi Akashi visited the Bosnian capital to persuade the Bosnian Government not to endanger peace moves by military action.

It was not clear whether Delic's comments were aimed at pressuring the Serbs to accept an international peace plan or whether he was outright calling for fresh combat.

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"The Bosnian Army is legally liberating territories temporarily occupied by the Serbs," he said.

"We are now entering the offensive stage of our defense but for the offensive action we will need to create some conditions, primarily the equipment.

"We are still technically inferior to the aggressor."

The mainly Moslem Bosnian Army has always maintained that additional weapons would allow it to reconquer territory now under Serb control.

U.S. President Bill Clinton said last Thursday that he would ask that the arms embargo against Bosnia-Herzegovina be lifted if the Serbs don't accept the peace plan by 15 October.

The Serbs control 70 percent of the former Yugoslav republic, 21 percent more than the share allotted them under the five-nation Contact Group's peace plan, which the Serbs have steadfastly rejected.

Delic said that in the absence of a political solution, it was up to his troops to liberate the country.

He added that he had no intention of allowing the Serbs to use the UN-brokered ceasefire to gain additional territory.

"As the commander of the Bosnian Army I have to say that I don't want to have the situation which we usually had during all ceasefires that the Bosnian state loses territories," he said.

Government Presents 13 Demands to Akashi

AU1608194794 Paris AFP in English 1928 GMT 16 Aug 94

[Article by Jacques Charmelot]

[Excerpts] Sarajevo, Aug 16 (AFP)—The Bosnian Government countered Tuesday [16 August] calls from UN special envoy Yasushi Akashi for an end to its forces' offensive against the separatist Serbs by presenting the UN with its own salvo of 13 demands.

The 13 points—including urgent calls for the UN to lift the Bosnian Serb blockade of Sarajevo—were outlined by Bosnian vice president Ejup Ganic in a four-hour meeting here with Akashi and UN Bosnia commander General Sir Michael Rose.

The UN envoy, who warned earlier Tuesday that the Bosnian offensive north of Sarajevo threatened ongoing peace efforts, told journalists that he had been reassured by the military "restraint" pledged by Ganic and minister for UN relations Hasan Muratovic.

Ganic, meanwhile, warned that the Bosnian war "will spread if (the Bosnian) Serbs continue to ignore the plan" for partitioning Bosnia formulated by the five-nation contact group of mediators. [passage omitted]

In an implicit admission that the blockade and the Bosnian offensive could be linked, Akashi said that the UN was intent on "not concentrating on one problem but on several at once." [passage omitted]

Sources close to the Croat-Moslem joint command in Sarajevo confirm that the aim of the offensive is to relieve Sarajevo, under virtually unbroken siege since April 1992, and act before winter to cut off the northern Posevina corridor, linking Serb-held land in the east and west. [passage omitted]

Ganic Protests to Akashi Over 'Ethnic Cleansing'

AU1608194594 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 16 Aug 94

[Statement by Ejup Ganic, Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency member and deputy president of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation, following talks with Butrus-Ghali's special envoy Yasushi Akashi in Sarajevo on 16 August—recorded]

[Text] We have just held a four-hour meeting, and we primarily discussed the opening of the so-called blue route across Sarajevo airport. The view of the Bosnia-Herzegovina authorities is that this road must be opened by the UN Protection Forces [UNPROFOR], as it passes through territory under UN control. Our view is also that this issue cannot be linked to any other. This issue of lifting the blockade of Sarajevo is a matter of survival.

The second issue that we discussed concerned additional measures for securing Sarajevo airport. (?We proposed stronger measures), military measures to prevent a catastrophe, since it is the Serbian side that has been firing at (?the aircraft). We accept any military measures that UNPROFOR undertakes, and we believe that [words indistinct] it can be done very quickly.

The third issue was the opening of Tuzla airport, which is located on territory controlled by our army. Every airport in the Balkans can be targeted [words indistinct] from 100 km away, 2 km away, or 3 km away and we do not understand why this airport has not been opened.

The fourth issue was the military situation around Sarajevo. We have signed an antisniper agreement and we are observing it, because we simply do not shoot at [word indistinct]. We pointed out that [Serbian] shelling is coming from within the exclusion zone, from Sarajevo toward Visoko, and similar activities [words indistinct]. We insisted that the (number) of arms collection points in the Sarajevo exclusion zone should be reduced and that additional security measures should be provided in order to save the United Nations the trouble of destroying an old tank from the 1950's, from 1952. We are in favor of general military stabilization, of course, throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina in accordance with our earlier agreement. However, from experience, for example, in Gorazde, Srebrenica, and other places, we know what happens when we do not respond in time to

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the regrouping of the aggressor's troops, so in future we will preempt such activities.

The fifth issue was the demilitarization of Sarajevo. We support this initiative wholeheartedly [words indistinct].

We also discussed the ethnic cleansing and terror directed against the non-Serbian population on the occupied territories, particularly in Banja Luka, Bijeljina, and Rogatica, and we have received assurances from UNPROFOR that they will intensify their activities and do more to prevent such things from happening.

The tough humanitarian situation and the difficult situation in the so-called protected zones was also discussed in particular.

General: Only Possible Solution 'Political'

94BA0367A Maribor VECER in Slovene 9 Jul 94 p 30

[Interview with Jovan Divjak, deputy commander of the General Staff of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army, by Bojan Bauman; place and date not given: "In the Company of the Mostar Bridge and the Rubber Plant"]

[Excerpt] [Passage omitted] [Bauman] Have you armed yourselves so much by now that you could also recover by military means what the Serbs occupied at the beginning of the war?

[Divjak] Only a political solution is possible in Bosnia. One also cannot expect a military solution because the aggressor is still materially superior today. Just a few months ago there were from 80-100 Serbian tanks around Sarajevo, and they had more than 1,500 cannons with calibers over 12.7 millimeters. We had six tanks in the city; at the very beginning of the war they destroyed three of them. We never had more than 150 weapons with larger calibers. We even had brigades that did not have a single mortar. The defense in the city never had multiple rocket launchers, or a single howitzer. The Bosnia-Herzegovina Army is even now primarily numerically stronger. We have over 200,000 soldiers, who are still poorly armed. The line of confrontation is 1,600 kilometers long. The Bosnia-Herzegovina Army is currently capable of holding back the aggressor at the front. It is also for that reason that a military solution to the dispute in Bosnia is not yet possible.

[Bauman] Together with the Croats, it will be much easier to establish at least a balance at the front.

[Divjak] The Croats have not fired a single shell at Serbian positions for more than a year. From that standpoint, the functioning of the military alliance is also questionable.

[Bauman] But the reports from the battlefields talk about joint action by the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army and the HVO [Croatian Defense Council].

[Divjak] At the beginning of June, Croatian artillery units fired from Orasje and the vicinity of Brcko. The position that Croatian soldiers are not fighting the Serbian ones is still valid. Admittedly, in Zepca the HVO did allow us to cross to our positions. The HVO units did not participate in the battles then, either. The front lines between the HVO and the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army are more than a kilometer apart after the cease-fire and the signing of the federation agreement, but we are still staying in our positions.

[Bauman] In the background of the current stories about the demilitarization of Sarajevo, the cease-fire, and the military tensions around Brcko, the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army is supposed to have quietly expanded the corridor in central Bosnia and created possibilities for the future Bosnian state. Can you confirm that news?

[Divjak] These are tactical successes by the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army. We have not known any respite. A month ago, we were just about to capture the radio relay installation on Maljevica. It was not possible to go further, however. There were bunkers and mine fields. The Serbs are successfully defending the positions they captured. The situation is the same at Vlasic. It is also said that we gained a large piece of territory at Ozren. These are mostly shifts of the front by at most 10 km; the tactical and operational situation is not changing.

Slovene Assistance

[Bauman] After the end of the war in Slovenia, Slovene politicians decided to help the Bosnians in their battle against the aggressor. How many weapons did you receive from Slovenia then?

[Divjak] I do not have much information about that. I do know that many middlemen, who borrowed a great deal on behalf of the government, were involved in arms dealing. There was not enough of those weapons to arm even two brigades (up to 4,000 soldiers). You equipped a Bosnian brigade in Slovenia, but it fell apart. It was intended to be mobilized in the Krajina. Volunteers applied, Bosnians from Europe, but after they returned to Bosnia-Herzegovina they completely forgot about fighting. I remember the Rijeka brigade; it left Slovenia with 700 soldiers. Only 300 soldiers reached Igman, and those did not stay with their brigade either. One of the units reached the Bosnian Krajina. The weapons that these newcomers received were mostly sold by them after they had met up with their relatives.

Slovenia understood the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina correctly from the very first day. It was Serbian aggression that was launched by extremist forces in the Serbian Democratic Party in an alliance with the Yugoslav Army. Slovenia also supported Bosnia-Herzegovina as a state under international law, and finally, you also aided us with humanitarian packages.

[Bauman] Former VIS [Security Information Service] officers who were allegedly responsible for sending 120 metric tons of weapons to Bosnia-Herzegovina are being tried right now in Maribor.

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[Divjak] I don't know much about that either, and because of international interests it is also not good to talk much about it. I do know that some cities in Bosnia-Herzegovina fell into Serbian hands because shipments of weapons were stopped on the way to Bosnia.

[Bauman] And in conclusion, how do you feel as a Serb in the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army, where you are still in an awkward minority in comparison with the Muslims?

[Divjak] In contacts with people, it has turned out repeatedly that my nationality has actually been an advantage for me. In the last 26 months, my Serbian origin has not led to any particular difficulties with them. In the army staff, I have noticed several times that I am being accepted with reservations. Even President Izetbegovic confided to me two months ago that back in November 1992 the Serbs informed him that it was not a coincidence that no one dared to attribute anything bad to Divjak. Izetbegovic told me that he took a risk at that time by keeping me on the staff. He also thought that the Serbs possibly wanted to get me replaced by doing that. I thus remained in the staff, but nevertheless I did not participate in a single one of the tactical preparations for Bosnia-Herzegovina Army operations. They did not even support my proposal for liberating Sarajevo, which I submitted in April or May 1993. It was not a matter of lifting the blockade, which was already an illusion. I planned that operation for the real liberation of the city. Six strong brigades, fully armed, would have been needed for that. The operation would have taken a month, and would have cost 100 million German marks. The money was not the obstacle.

Croats Protest Draft Into Muslim Army

LD1608190694 Mostar Croatian Radio Herceg-Bosna in Serbo-Croatian 1600 GMT 16 Aug 94

[Text] The municipal council of the Croatian Democratic Union [HDZ] of Lukavac has issued a statement in connection with the mobilization of Croats into the Bosnia-Herzgovina army. It says:

Croat youths from the area of the Lukavac municipality are still being forcibly mobilized into units of the Bosnia-Herzgovina Army, which is only making Croats from the Lukavac municipality move out at a faster rate.

A meeting was held recently in Lukavac between representatives of the Reformists and Social Democrats, that is, ex-communists, and Generasl Kadic. The conclusions from this meeting were in stark contrast to the decisions of the relevant bodies of the Bosnia-Herzegovina federation, and detrimental to the interests of the Croat people. Nobody even bothered to invite a representative of the HDZ to this meeting, although the HDZ is the sole party representing the interests of the Croat people.

The HDZ municipal committee of Lukavac municipality is calling on all Croats in the area of the Lukavac municipality to persevere in their struggle for their rights, stemming from their status as a constituent nation and guaranteed by the constitution of the Bosnia-Herzegovina federation, the statement issued by the Lukavac municipal council of the HDZ says.

UN Reports Abdic Declares Unilateral Cease-Fire

AU1708110794 Paris AFP in English 1053 GMT 17 Aug 94

[Text] Zagreb, Aug 17 (AFP)—Moslem rebel leader Fikret Abdic has proclaimed a unilateral ceasefire in the Bihac enclave in western Bosnia, the United Nations announced Wednesday here.

Abdic, who declared Bihac autonomous last September, now controls only 20 percent of the enclave. The truce began at 2200 GMT Monday and appeared to be holding Wednesday, according to the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR).

Captain Francois Hameury, spokesman for UNPROFOR's 3d French Battalion, said his battalion had received written notification of the truce Tuesday morning.

He said a next round of talks between representatives of Abdic forces and of the mainly Bosnian Army were due to begin in Coralici shortly. The Bosnian Army has captured most of the Bihac enclave.

Abdic is a former member of the Bosnian collective presidency and a business tycoon.

Hameury said that anti-aircraft fire overnight forced a German cargo plane to suspend relief airdrops over Bihac.

Hameury said the firing came from afar, "perhaps from (Croatia's breakway) Krajina (region which is controlled by Serb separatists)."

He added that UNPROFOR could not say that the firing was aimed at planes taking part in humanitarian airdrops.

Sarajevo Prisoner Exchange Called Off by Serbs

AU1708093494 Paris AFP in English 0911 GMT 17 Aug 94

[Text] Sarajevo, Aug 17 (AFP)—A prisoner exchange between Bosnian Government and Serb forces failed to go ahead as planned overnight Tuesday to Wednesday, the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) said here.

Thirteen prisoners from each side were to have been exchanged at the Bridge of Fraternity and Brotherhood in central Sarajevo, but the deal was called off at the last minute when the Serbs said they could produce only 11 prisoners, because two others were currently in Montenegro.

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The Bosnian Government side refused an offer for an 11-11 exchange, according to UNPROFOR spokesman Major Dacre Holloway.

Both sides are believed to hold some 500 prisoners each and all were to have been released under the terms of a June 8 truce accord.

So far, however, only 22 prisoners have been released.

The exchange was to have taken place on Friday, but was postponed when the Bosnian Government side asked for the prisoners to be released in central Sarajevo rather than in Dupovici, a small suburb southwest of Sarajevo.

Meanwhile, ceasefire violations in and around Sarajevo decreased Tuesday, compared to Monday, Holloway said.

The number of firing incidents, mainly along the front-line, dropped from 684 on Monday to 460 on Tuesday.

There were no sniping incidents in town on the third day of an agreement between the two warring parties to stop such incidents.

However details on how the accord was is to be implemented still remain to be worked out, according to UNPROFOR officials.

The tram service, which was discontinued after several shooting incidents, has still not been restarted.

Monetary Chaos Viewed in Sarajevo

94BA0379B Ljubljana DNEVNIK in Slovene 18 Jul 94 p 7

[Article by Zoran Udovicic: "Monetary Confusion"]

[Text] Sarajevo, 18 Jul—Last Friday real chaos occurred in bakeries. It was announced by the bank that the Bosnia-Herzegovina coupon banknotes in the denominations of 1,000 and 5,000 dinars had been withdrawn from circulation. One loaf of bread costs 6,000 coupons. Since the sale of bread in Sarajevo is rationed (230 grams per day per person), bachelors who now have to pay 2,000 coupons for their piece of bread were the ones primarily in difficulty.

Some regional communities stopped sales in spite of serious annoyance from citizens, others introduced a "debtors' book," and many people simply set a new price: 10,000 dinars. Two producers coped the best: They treated their fellow citizens to bread all week, which cost them only 20 German marks [DM] for all 3,000 residents.

The bread case is an illustration of the chaotic situation in the Sarajevo market and the complete degradation of the monetary and economic systems. Wherever the state's fingers have not reached since the first day of war, the mark reigns. The prices of goods and services, depending on conflicts and the blockade, have risen to astronomical heights. At the same time, the state has continued to print money without any backing, since Sarajevo's economic base has been completely destroyed, and it has used Bosnia-Herzegovina coupons to pay the army and officials, prescribed the prices of municipal services, and charged contributions and taxes.

The criteria and amounts of those monetary transactions are of a welfare nature, and there is a complete discrepancy between them and the parallel system that is denoted by the mark. It is only from this month on that the official use of foreign currencies will also be in effect, and they can be used to pay for everything, except for payments to workers, payments for municipal services, and state and judicial fees.

If you want to extend your driver's license in Sarajevo now, you need 20,000 dinars for the fee (one pfennig), but you will pay half a mark for a money order at a bookstore. If you are lucky enough to get a state job in wartime, you will buy a worker's booklet (printed back during the time of socialism) for DM20, for which, at the average wage, you will have to work for 40 months. Numerous graduate students in Sarajevo have not yet picked up a college diploma because the necessary forms and other nonuniversity actions cost DM70. A funeral is currently the most expensive thing in Sarajevo, however. The cheapest coffin costs DM350, and people who have paid contributions to funeral societies for many years can only receive seven or eight marks in assistance. Anyone who does not have money will have to bury his dearest one in a plastic UNHCR bag.

The city authorities are trying at least to simulate peacetime. On 1 July they raised the rent from 1,000 to 30,000 dinars per square meter, and they are also demanding payment for electricity, water, and trolley service. Whoever cannot afford it is not being forced, but at least the officials will be able to calculate how much it costs to live in Sarajevo.

For Sarajevo residents' friends and relatives abroad, it is not yet time to stop sending foreign exchange money orders to Sarajevo.

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Serbs, Croats Fire on UNPROFOR Posts

LD1608192794 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1824 GMT 16 Aug 94

[Text] Knin, Aug. 16 (TANJUG)—Observation posts of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in UNPA [UN Protected Area] sector south have been attacked four times in the past week's time.

This was announced Tuesday by Allan Roberts, spokesman for the UNPA in the interposition zone between Serb Krajina and Croatian forces. Roberts also told a news conference in Knin that UNPROFOR posts were fired on three times by the Croatian and once by the Krajina Serb infantry. On August 9, he said, Croatians shot at an observation post of the Czech battalion near the Lika locality of Lulici, hitting electrical installations on the top of this post.

Asked about the Krajina Serb forces' shooting, Roberts only said that this was referred to in a report by the Canadian battalion.

This interposition zone was set up pursuant to an agreement signed last March by Croatia and the republic of Serb Krajina. The UNPROFOR-controlled zone is free of heavy weapons.

Roberts said that an increasing number of people were armed in the interposition zone, near which Croatian forces were digging trenches. He said the two sides agreed to a proposal by the UNHCR (U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees) on resettling the two sides' villages in the interposition zone. He said the two sides received the lists of villages and were expected to name next week those they wanted first to be resettled.

Asked about a recent article in the Zagreb weekly GLOBUS which asserted that a concentration camp for Croats had been set up outside Knin, Roberts said he was surprised at this article. The article, said he, was a good lesson for UNPROFOR to be more cautious when giving entry permits. He added he was writing a letter to deny allegations in this article.

He explained that the facts were consistently distorted throughout the article. In his sector south, he made it clear, there was no concentration camp.

The republic of Serb Krajina was set up in 1991 by Serbs in their ethnic and historical lands in the former Yugoslav republic of Croatia, responding to its secession and attempts to downgrade the constituent Serbs to a national minority. Since March 1992, Serb Krajina has been an UNPA.

Refugee Blockade of UN Checkpoints Ends

LD1608181594 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 16 Aug 94

[Excerpt] Croatian police today took control of all 19 UN checkpoints that had been blocked by refugees, Milivoj Tomas, head of the Croatian Government office for relations with UNPROFOR [UN Protection Forces], said in a telephone conversation with HINA.

He confirmed that refugees had lifted the blockade of seven remaining UNPROFOR checkpoints. "Refugees are still at several checkpoints, but they are not causing any problems," Tomas said adding that blockade of all checkpoints was lifted this morning, as it had been agreed with UNPROFOR. [passage omitted]

RSK President Martic Addresses 'State'

LD1708000894 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2305 GMT 16 Aug 94

["Pool" item]

[Text] Knin, Aug. 16 (TANJUG)—Serb Krajina president Milan Martic said Tuesday that Krajina Serbs have finally realized their centuries-old dream of having their own state after four years of bloody war.

Martic addressed the nation on the occasion of August 17—the day of the uprising of Krajina Serbs in 1991 in answer to Croatia's forcible secession from the former Yugoslav federation.

"Today, when we have four years of bloody war behind us with a great number of victims, devastated and ravished villages, we must say that the sacrifices have not been in vain because we have managed to create our state," Martic said.

Martic said that no-one can make calculations with Krajina, because only the people can decide about its fate. The priority task is to strengthen its statehood, he said.

"Despite our peaceful policy we are witness to daily threats from the Croatian authorities that they will rekindle the flames of war and try to realize their goals by attacking Krajina," Martic said in the message.

"We do not want war, but if it is enforced upon us, we shall fight it until the final victory, because we have no other choice," the Krajina president said.

The republic of Serb Krajina has been a U.N.-protected area since the spring of 1992, but Croatia has attacked it four times, killing more than 1,000 people, mostly civilians.

General Grachev Said Legitimizing Criminals

94BA0375A Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian 29 Jul 94 p 7

[Commentary by Aleksandar Milosevic: "Kiss for the Executioner, Scorn for the Victims"]

[Text] *What is Russia's real policy toward Croatia, the one proclaimed by Kozyrev and Kerestedzhiyants or the one demonstrated by General Grachev?*

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Russia recognizes the territorial integrity of Croatia within its internationally recognized borders. The UNPA [UN Protected Area] zones are a constituent and inalienable part of Croatia.... In the past, these and similar statements have been heard from numerous Russian political, diplomatic, and state officials. There was no reason to question their sincerity until Wednesday, 27 July. A shadow was cast over current Russian policy by Gen. Pavel Grachev. On that date, Yeltsin's minister of defense met in Erdut, in the occupied part of Croatia, with Milan Martic, Borislav Mikelic, and other leaders of the Serbian rebellion in Croatia. From Serbia, where one day earlier he had held talks with Milosevic, Pavle Bulatovic, Gen. Perisic, Karadzic, and Gen. Mladic, the Russian minister entered the occupied part of Croatia through the part of the border controlled by Serb rebels. In the presence of numerous Serbian and other journalists, Grachev accepted the report of one of the chetnik dukes, bowed in the occupied part of Croatia before the flag of those who are the occupiers, and reviewed a chetnik unit lined up in his honor, but the crowning event was his exchange of embraces and kisses with Martic.

Through such actions by Gen. Grachev, legitimacy is given to the criminals Martic and Mikelic, who have been validly sentenced by courts in the Republic of Croatia, legitimacy is given to the chetnik hordes, and the embraces and kisses with Milan Martic constitute scorn for the hundreds and thousands of victims of Serb aggression. By embracing Martic and bowing before his flag, Gen. Pavel Grachev has insulted the graves of the killed civilians in Skabrnja, Vecin, Kozibrod, Vukovar, and all over Croatia. This is an affront to the Croatian state and its citizens.

After the meeting and talks in occupied Erdut, Grachev visited members of the Russian battalion of UNPROFOR [UN Protection Forces] between occupied Brsadin and Nemetin. This is not objectionable, since prior to the Russian minister many other ministers and heads of states and governments whose soldiers are part of UNPROFOR in Croatia have visited their soldiers. However, none of them have been in contact, before or after, with the Serb rebels, as was Gen. Grachev, none bowed before their flag, and none kissed them and embraced them.

After this, it is necessary to ask seriously: What is the real policy of Russia toward Croatia? Is it the one declared in statements by Minister Kozyrev and envoy Kerest-edzhiyants or the one demonstrated by Gen. Grachev?

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Gligorov, Kinkel Make Statements After Talks

AU1608095894 Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA in Macedonian 13 Aug 94 pp 1-2

[Report by Mirka Velinovska and Emil Krstevski: "The European Union Will Do Its Best To Help Macedonia"]

[Text] Hamburg, 12 August—President Kiro Gligorov had a discussion with Klaus Kinkel, German foreign minister and chairman of the European Union [EU], at the hotel in which the Macedonian [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia] delegation was staying in Hamburg.

At the meeting they reviewed various possibilities for help that the EU and Germany should give Macedonia, as well as some other potentials that Germany, being the chairman of the EU, has in influencing Greece to lift the embargo. Gligorov and Kinkel discussed a number of questions of interest for the region, the situation in Macedonia after the implementation of the sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro, as well as the damages that Macedonia has been suffering from the illegal Greek embargo.

They also discussed the modalities and possibilities for helping the Republic of Macedonia, that is how to make this assistance concrete within the framework of the EU, especially what can be done by Germany as chairman for fulfilling the obligations that the EU undertook at the Edinburgh summit. It was also emphasized that Germany, as a country that had so far demonstrated a great interest and understanding for the Macedonian situation, must do its best to reduce the difficulties that our country is facing. After the meeting, Klaus Kinkel and Kiro Gligorov gave their statements.

At the beginning President Gligorov expressed his gratitude for the warm reception of the Macedonian delegation in Hamburg and Germany and he thanked Germany for everything that it has done for the Republic of Macedonia, as well as for its intention to continue doing so. He assessed this, as well as all the other previous meetings with his host Klaus Kinkel, as an open and fruitful one, and then he added:

"As you know, Macedonia is the unique republic of former Yugoslavia that has remained outside a war, and it has accomplished an internal stability through mutual inter-ethnic understanding. However, regardless of all this, and through no fault of its own, Macedonia is suffering great consequences from the war in former Yugoslavia because it is implementing the sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro. These sanctions, however, are mostly affecting Macedonia. Our country is also suffering the consequences from another neighboring country that has introduced an illegal embargo which has been condemned by the whole world. I think that Macedonia has served as an example that it is possible to live in another manner in the Balkans and that it deserves political and economic assistance.

"We are greatly interested in having friendly relations with Greece. We are ready for a lasting friendship and cooperation with this neighboring country, but we think that the embargo must be lifted, because it has proven to be fruitless and detrimental. As far as the dispute about the name is concerned we consider that it is an irrational issue and we are ready for a full cooperation with Greece, but in a normal manner and with full respect by Greece for our national identity. It is absolutely unnatural that the only country of former Yugoslavia that has not participated and is in no way included in the present war is not yet a member of the CSCE, although this is in the interest of the Balkans and Europe.

"We fully support the plan of the contact group for a political solution to the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina, no matter whether we think that it is the best solution or not that can be offered by the international community. However, we firmly believe that, as soon as peace governs, the ethnic cleansing and the attempts for a violent change of borders of an internationally recognized state will stop. And finally, I deeply believe that Macedonia and Germany will promote their bilateral relations, although they are extremely good even at this stage. I want to avail myself of this opportunity to greet all the German efforts throughout the process of Macedonia's independence and international recognition, as well as to express my great appreciation for the efforts made by Germany, as the chairman of the EU, in the contact group for a faster solution of the Bosnian conflict. I also appreciate Germany's efforts and engagements for the admission of the Republic of Macedonia to the CSCE, for economic assistance from various European institutions, as well as for the lifting of the Greek embargo."

On that occasion German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel said:

"President Gligorov and I have evaluated that bilateral relations between Germany and Macedonia have been promoted wonderfully to our mutual benefit. We have excellent cooperation in all fields, and we consider that it will be further promoted. Our opinion is that the Republic of Macedonia is very important for the EU and at this moment the most important thing of all is to help it live through the economic difficulties. Germany, as the chairman of the Union, will do its best to help, because Macedonia has deserved it with its hitherto policy and behavior. We are making mediating efforts to resolve the dispute with Greece, particularly concerning the name, and we support the efforts of mediator Cyrus Vance for solving the dispute. As you know, there is a process going on in the European Court on the legaliity of the Greek embargo and although the European Court has rejected the accusation of the European Commission, it does not necessarily mean that the final decision will be coincidental. As you know, we, as well as the European Commission and the EU, still stand on the position that the embargo is illegal and politically unjustified, that is detrimental, and we consider that the conflict between

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Macedonia and Greece must be resolved as soon as possible and the embargo lifted urgently. We need, that is Europe needs, a fast solution because it is not in the interest of Europe to destabilize Macedonia because this could lead to a destabilization in the whole region.

"Macedonia has proven that it can function as a multiethnic and democratic state in extremely difficult conditions, and therefore we think that it deserves our full support.

"Germany is interested in Macedonia's urgent entry into the CSCE, and it will do its best to make this happen as soon as possible to the interest of all.

"We also talked with President Gligorov about the implementation of the sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro, and it is clear that Macedonia is obliged to implement them even if they are reinforced. However, we are aware that this will deteriorate Macedonia's bad situation and that is why Germany will do its best to make up for all damages by using various methods of the PHARE [Economic Reconstruction Aid for Poland and Hungary] program and Group 24, as well as through multilateral and unilateral forms of assistance and cooperation.

"As far as the international situation of Macedonia is concerned, I congratulate President Gligorov for the high reward that he was awarded by the ABA Association for the application of law in Macedonia and for the democratic achievements of this policy, for the outcome and the way the census was carried out, as well as for the stability and cooperation among the ethnic groupings.

"Concerning the situation in former Yugoslavia, that is Bosnia-Herzegovina, President Gligorov and I agreed to support the plan of the contact group, and we also agreed that the Bosnian Serbs must understand that this is the last chance for them to accept the plan of the contact group and for a political solution of the conflict in Bosnia, because the further consequences will be dramatic and unpredictable.

"Finally, we concluded that there are excellent relations between the Republic of Macedonia and Germany, and our intentions are to help Macedonia economically and politically in all possible ways."

Republic To Apply for Railroad Corridor

AU1208133394 Skopje MILS-NEWS in English 12 Aug 94

[Unattributed report: "Transport Corridor for Macedonia]

[Text] Republic of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia] has initiated a procedure on railroad transport corridor through Federal Yugoslavia. The corridor will link Tabanovce (Macedonia) and Dimitrovgrad (Bulgaria). Transport of Macedonian goods will be accompanied with UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] representatives. This will ease the transport of oil and raw materials, and will reduce the losses of the Macedonian railroad company, which will run up to $8 million per month.

Albanians Aim at Proportional Representation

LD1508162694 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 0019 GMT 15 Aug 94

[Text] Skopje, 15 Aug (TANJUG)—The main political aim of the largest Albanian party in Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia], the Party for Democratic Prosperity [Partija za Demokratski Prosperitet—PDP] is no longer the federalization of the republic but an integration of Albanians, or rather, their proportional representation in all political, state, and other institutions.

Abdurahman Aliti, a PDP official and deputy in the Macedonian assembly, stated this for NOVA MAKEDONIJA of Skopje which last week conducted interviews with officials of major parliamentary and nonparliamentary parties on the topic of the federalization of Macedonia.

According to Aliti, the policy of integration has already been embraced by the PDP and the Albanians in Macedonia, although there are still differences in understanding and interpretations of it. The proportional integration of the Albanians in a common state and political institutions renders the territorial federalization of Macedonia unnecessary, Aliti said.

In his opinion, the division of Macedonia into Macedonian and Albanian federal units and the proportional integration of the Albanians into all structures of a new state do not contradict each other. On the contrary, they can be used more effectively to enhance the stability of the political system in Macedonia.

The largest Macedonian political parties represented in the assembly believe that "the concept of determining relations within the state is clearly specified in the constitution" and that "minority rights need to be in line with international standards."

New Leaders for FYROM Ethnic Albanian Party

94P21044A Skopje FLAKA E VELLAZERIMIT in Albanian 18 Jul 94 pp 1, 4

[Article by E. Shala: "Abdurrahman Haliti—Chairman of the Party for Democratic Prosperity"]

[Text] Tetovo, 18 Jul—The third (extrordinary) assembly of the Party for Democratic Prosperity [PDP] was held yesterday in Tetovo. One point on the agenda was the irrevocable resignation of Xheladin Murati, the chairman up until now. During the assembly, the leadership of the largest Albanian party in Macedonia was consolidated, with the election of two deputy chairmen and a member of the Central Presidium of the PDP.

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At the beginning of the assembly, Xheladin Murati asked the attendees if the meeting should be closed, without the participation of newsmen from the country and from abroad. The assembly members voted to admit the journalists.

Explaining his irrevocable resignation, Xheladin Murati said that it was a completely normal personal act which occurs in political activity and he asked the assembly members to accept it and not to be influenced by the gossip which appeared here and there in the media about the reasons for the resignation, gossip whose aim is manipulation.

Since the PDP Statute does not provide for the acceptance or the rejection of a resignation but this act is only noted, the chairman of the meeting, Naser Zyberi, permitted the matter to be presented for discussion by a number of assembly members. On this occasion, various views were presented in regard to Xheladin Murati's resignation, criticizing its timing, saying it was hasty and ill-timed now that the second elections are approaching, when the party, because of his commitment, has consolidated its ranks, for which he was given expressions of gratitude. The assembly members were informed about the positions taken in the PDP branches in Gostivar, Kumanovo, Kercovo, and Karshiako. Xheladin Murati did not respond to any of the requests that he provide further explanations of his hasty resignation and Naser Zyberi had no other choice but to elect a new chairman in accordance with the provisions of the Statute, saying that the electoral commission had decided to propose one candidate in the election of a chairman and two deputy chairmen. Muhamet Halili was not satisfied with this and the decision of the Presidium of the PDP Branch in Tetovo was publicized at the Assembly. The Tetovo branch had nominated two people for the position of Presidium member from this branch (Ilir Luma and Muhamet Halili), with the recommendation that the candidate who would be elected from Tetovo would be the counter-candidate for the position of chairman of the PDP.

After Muhamet Halili presented some points of disagreement in relations with ministers Beqir Zhuta and Servet Avziu over their views on the organization of the PDP, he said that he would not be a candidate for member of the Presidium and chairman of the PDP. Then Naser Zyberi explained that the Tetovo branch cannot nominate a candidate for chairman since this is done by the assembly members of this branch in their own assembly. After Muhamet Halili withdrew his candidacy, the assembly members, with 23 votes "for", elected Ilir Luma a member of the Central Presidium. Abdurrahman Haliti [Abdurahman Aliti] insisted that Luma should also be a candidate for PDP chairman but this proposal was not accepted since 17 assembly members voted "against".

The list of leaders to be elected at this assembly includes the replacements for two deputy chairmen of the Central Presidium, positions which have been vacant for six months. One of these positions has been promised to assembly members from Kumanovo. Naser Zyberi presented the opinion of the nominating commission, proposing two candidates: Xhemail Hajdari from Gostivar and Mujadin Bajrami from Kercovo. At this time, there was a reaction from the assembly members from Kumanovo, who were not familiar with the position of their candidate for this post, Ismail Ismaili, who did not comply with the preliminary procedure. Therefore, an opening was created for the election of the candidate from Kercovo. After much discussion, and a new procedure for the new candidate from Kumanovo, an agreement was reached among the Kumanovo assembly members and the two candidates' names appeared on the ballots.

The demand of the assembly members that the voting for the positions of the chairman and the two deputy chairmen should be open was not accepted, even with the insistence of Abdurrahman Haliti who stated openly: "if the vote is not secret, I think that I will become chairman."

The assembly members of the third (extraordinary) assembly elected Abdurrahman Haliti chairman, with 37 votes "for" (of the 42 assembly members present) and 2 votes "against". Xhemal Hajdari was elected deputy chairman with 39 votes "for" and no votes "against" and Mujadin Bajrami, with 37 votes "for" and 2 votes "against". With the election of Ilir Luma as member of the Central Presidium, the party consolidated and completed the ranks of its leadership.

In his speech on the occasion of his election as chairman of the PDP, Abdurrahman Haliti said that he considers the position to be a great responsibility and obligation. He said: "I will work as hard as I can, at all times and in every situation, to carry out this assignment with honor. I will commit myself to a party of trust and dignity, to a serious party, to a party which will belong to all of us. The starting point of these aims will be the program and the programmed goals. We will have discipline and respect for the agreements and regulations which we have approved. Above all, we will do our work without declarations and promises, showing that we are ready to achieve the civil and national rights of the people and of the PDP's members and supporters."

On the basis of what they heard, reporters at the third assembly of the PDP had many questions. These are two of the most important ones: first, has everything which should be said and known about the reasons for the resignation of Xheladin Murati been said? And second: would this meeting have gone in another direction if they had voted to have a closed meeting? We believe that there will be answers to these questions in time. The main thing is that this party, finally, has consolidated its ranks and elected a leadership which, we believe, will guide it in realizing its aims as the new chairman promised.

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Tensions in Albanian-Macedonian Relations Viewed

94BA0362C Skopje PULS in Macedonian 15 Jul 94 p 16

[Article by Saso Ordanovski: "Will We Hold Out Just a Little Longer?"]

[Excerpt] The political turmoil among the Albanians in Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia] is approaching the boiling point, several months before the official election campaign is to begin. The census in Macedonia, regardless of the government's claims to the contrary, was a failure, once again because of a boycott by part of the Albanian population. After the tragic incident in Tetovo, there was a fierce attack against the independence of the Macedonian judicial system, blamed for the severe sentences that were passed against the Macedonian citizens involved in the latest "paramilitary" scandal (the latest, since even before that we had similar scandals with other Macedonian citizens involved), and then the withdrawal of the PDP [Party of Democratic Prosperity] from the parliament's work. As I am writing this article, some of the deputies are entering the parliament hall in which confidence in the government is being discussed, but announcements are arriving about the organization of demonstrations in Debar by Macedonian citizens of Albanian nationality; there has also been an announcement of the resignation of the current president of the PDP, Dzeladin Murati (who, however, is appearing in the parliamentary hall).

It seems to me that this is the time when the future political profile of the Albanian minority in Macedonia will be determined. The elections can then even be a formality for them. That should be understood by the "other" side, since it can be assumed that it matters to everyone what the dominant political profile in this country is like. There is no possibility that the radicalization of the Albanian electorate can go without a reaction from the Macedonian political side.

This observation leads us to the well-known cliche that Albanian-Macedonian relations in this country are discussed exclusively in terms like "demands," "concession," "blackmail," and so forth. The tension on both sides is understandable, but the fact is that what has been invested in the country's stability over the past three years, with a great deal of effort by all political (state and party) factors, should not be risked by insistence on national prejudices on both sides. [passage omitted]

Publication Considers Country Serbian Land

94BA0375B Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian 1 Aug 94 p 9

[Article by Dragan Djuric: "Macedonia Also Under Aegis of Memorandum? DIJASPORA Corrects Dobrica Cosic"]

[Text] *The first issue of the publication on the Serbian diaspora ominously recalls that "Southern Serbia was the center of Serbian statehood in ancient times" and concludes: "Give Bosnia, Dalmatia, and Croatia to Serbia and it will not be able to hold them unless you give it Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia]."*

Skopje—Although according to Dobrica Cosic, a person with the ambition to be the "spiritual father" of the Serbs, Macedonia was not celebrated as one of the potential "Serb lands" during the formulation of the famous SANU [Serbian Academy of Science and Art] Memorandum, the first issue of DIJASPORA attempts to correct this "forgetfulness" by the Serbian academicians. This is the first issue of the bulletin of the Center for Serbian Diaspora Research of the Institute for Political Study in Belgrade, which aims, twice a year, to "objectively inform and attempt to influence foreign public opinion to change the media image of Serbs." Noting that DIJASPORA wants to present "the truth and irrefutable historical facts," the entire issue of this bulletin is devoted to, as the publication puts it, the "FYRO (Former Yugoslav Republic of) Macedonia."

Threats Against Macedonian Orthodox Church

From the very beginning, however, this attempt to present "the truth" is to no avail. Thus, this new contribution by Serbian scholars to blazing the "scholarly" trail for Serbian policy takes as its starting point the utterly unsubstantiated fact that "according to the latest statistical indicators" there are 300,000 Serbs living in Macedonia. Admittedly, it is noted somewhat in passing that this is "significantly more than was expressed in the 1981 census when, officially, a figure of 44,466 citizens of Serb nationality was made public."

We would add that approximately this same official number of Serbs was indicated by the 1991 census as well, while according to "Radio Free Europe," which publicized unofficial data from the recent special census, there are now "two percent fewer Serbs in Macedonia than there were in 1991." This figure seems logical because, among other reasons, some of the Serbs left Macedonia when the former Yugoslav Army withdrew from its territory. Still, for precise data from this year's census (conducted with European Union monitoring), it will be necessary to wait for their official publication, scheduled for mid-October.

Also published in the issue was a list of Serbian churches and monasteries in Macedonia, of which, according to DIJASPORA, there are no fewer and no more than 158. But that is obviously significantly more than 20, which is how many were cited by Serbian Patriarch Pavle in the list he sent to the Macedonian Government and to the United Nations. At this point it is worth recalling the current conflict between the Serbian Orthodox Church (SPC) and the Macedonian Orthodox Church (MPC). The SPC, under the threat of punishment, has called on the MPC to come back under the wing of its "canonical mother."

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Judging from this propaganda material, Macedonia will not have an easy time of it. In its historical retrospective, DIJASPORA recalls that "present-day Southern Serbia was the center of Serbian statehood in ancient times." Throughout history it has had various names: "the Serbian borderland," "the Serbian old Slavic lands," "the Serbian war lands".... Does this mean that Belgrade is preparing to place Macedonia under the aegis of the memorandum?

Ever Since Emperor Dusan...

This former Yugoslav republic is useful in two cases—if Serbia wins the war, but also if it loses. If Serbia is not allowed to expand westward, DIJASPORA suggests between the lines that it is necessary to return to the footsteps of old Serbian medieval rulers, who expanded their domain southward. The most famous of them was Emperor Dusan who, having proclaimed himself emperor of the Serbs and Greeks, promulgated in Skopje his famous "Dusan's Code." In other words, Serbian policy could attempt in the south to compensate for any "losses" in the west. On the other hand, if Belgrade succeeds in its ambition to unite the "Serb lands," it would not hurt to include Macedonia in them.

Referring to statements by various Serbian scholars from the end of last century and the beginning of this one, DIJASPORA cites the "capital conclusion" that "the Serbian state must have Macedonia."

"That is where its strength lies. Look at history and you will see that Serbia was strong only when it had Macedonia, but as soon as it lost it, the collapse of the powerful organism of the Serbian empire began. Macedonia is for us what Samson's hair was to him: Cut it off and his strength is gone," DIJASPORA explains. And it concludes: "With Macedonia we will carry out our mission in the history of the Balkans and southeastern Europe. Give Serbia all the western regions of the peninsula—Bosnia, Dalmatia, Croatia—and it will not be able to hold them unless you give it Macedonia."

Any commentary on this scholarly attempt, which is obviously intended to substantiate the theory about the "Serb character" of Macedonia, is superfluous. The logical question that arises in the end is this: What is going on behind this "scholarly foundation"? One thing is certain, however: DIJASPORA will not succeed in one of its main ambitions—"to change the media image of Serbs in the world."

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Federal

Government Denies Supplying Arms to Bosnian Serbs

LD1608162294 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1552 GMT 16 Aug 94

[Text] Belgrade, 16 Aug (TANJUG)—The government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia [FRY] is energetically rejecting as completely unfounded and untrue the accusations by Muslim-Croat federation prime minister Haris Silajdzic that Yugoslavia is allegedly continuing to supply the Bosnian Serbs with weapons despite its current embargo—says a statement from today's session of the federal government presided over by Prime Minister Radoje Kontic.

The FRY government concluded that such statements are "in the spirit of the practice followed by the Muslim side in the former Bosnia-Herzegovina to fabricate untrue facts in order to misinform the international public, thus making it turn against Yugoslavia."

"Silajdzic's accusation that the FRY is preparing aggression and that it could use chemical weapons in the future serves the same purpose. The international community, primarily the United Nations and those countries whose troops are serving in the peace mission in the former Bosnia-Herzegovina, know that it is precisely the Muslim army that has been threatening to use chemical weapons, and has been engaging in provocations and intensifying offensive actions against the Serb republic at the height of the efforts to restore peace and find a compromise.

"It is clear that the goal of Silajdzic's malicious statement is to cover up the Bosnian Muslim's aggressive policy, particularly the violations of the embargo on arms deliveries to Bosnia; many documents on this are in the possession of the international community. Another goal is to secure support for their demands for the UN arms embargo to be lifted.

"It is clear that Silajdzic and the Bosnian Muslim leadership are worried by the fact that the international community is recognizing that the FRY is pursuing a policy of peace and investing maximum efforts aimed at achieving a just and lasting political solution in former Bosnia-Herzegovina as soon as possible," says the statement issued by the Federal Ministry for Information after today's session of the Federal Government.

Stoltenberg Comments on Talks in Belgrade

LD1608224594 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2233 GMT 16 Aug 94

["Pool" item]

[Text] New York, Aug. 16 (TANJUG)—International mediator Thorvald Stoltenberg said Tuesday that more sanctions against Yugoslavia would be unjustifiable if its border with the Bosnian Serbs was sealed.

Speaking after briefing the United Nations Security Council on his talks in Belgrade and Pale last week, Stoltenberg said he had no doubt the border was closed. However, Stoltenberg said he believed the international community should still seek the deployment of foreign monitors on the Drina River that separates Yugoslavia and the Bosnian Serb republic.

Stoltenberg said Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic had objected to the deployment of foreign monitors, but said Milosevic had invited journalists to freely check for themselves to see if the border was really closed.

The Yugoslav Government on August 4 severed all political and economic ties with the Bosnian Serb republic, closing their common border.

That decision came after the Bosnian Serb National Assembly rejected Yugoslav and Serbian calls for the acceptance of the "Contact Group" plan for the territorial division of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The assembly voted instead to put the matter to the people in a referendum on August 27-28.

Stoltenberg said he had informed Milosevic that the deployment of foreign monitors would result in an easing of the sanctions.

Stoltenberg said he had failed to persuade the Bosnian Serb government to accept the plan and said the Serbs had insisted that the plan was designed to be detrimental to them and was therefore unacceptable. He said the Bosnian Serbs might settle for less territory that would be of improved quality, saying that the Bosnian Serbs had complained that the territory they were to receive was not productive or safe enough to form a viable state. He said the Serbs had complained that the vital Serb corridor near the Sava River town of Brcko in northern Bosnia would be too narrow to defend.

Stoltenberg also said the Bosnian Serbs objected to surrendering the productive region around Banja Vrucica in north central Bosnia and the iron ore mine near Prijedor in northwest Bosnia.

Stoltenberg said he hoped the Bosnian Serbs would eventually reconsider and accept the plan or that Serbia would allow foreign monitors on its border. He said the plan should be accepted to bring hostilities to an end and to resume talks on constitutional, military and other solutions. Stoltenberg said a Bosnian Serb "no" to the peace plan would mean no progress and would leave the situation the same as when the other warring sides had rejected previous proposals.

The Norwegian diplomat said any decision to unilaterally lift the arms embargo for the Muslims would trigger violations of other U.N. sanctions.

Before briefing the Security Council, Stoltenberg met with representatives of the contact group. He will meet with representatives of U.N. troop-contributing countries on Tuesday afternoon.

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Serbia

Commentary Views Milosevic Rejection of Observers

AU1608142394 Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 16 Aug 94 p 14

[Commentary by Nikola Burzan: "A Small Sacrifice for a Great Aim"]

[Excerpts] In his long and fruitful diplomatic career, Thorvald Stoltenberg cannot have had such meager results from a mission as the latest one to Pale and Belgrade. His report to Butrus-Ghali will only consist of three "no's": Karadzic's (though everyone has stopped counting his) "no" to the Contact Group peace plan, Milosevic's "no" to the deployment of international observers on the Drina River, and the patriarch's "no" to changing his view on the Yugoslav blockade of the Srpska republic.

Neither persuasion helped, nor did anything from his rich repertoire of diplomatic skills. Even if one could have guessed that Pale and the patriarch would not give an inch, the real surprise is Milosevic's refusal to allow the deployment of international (civilian) observers on the Drina as yet another gesture of good will and plausibility of his "new policy." [passage omitted]

Both Moscow and Washington are demanding the deployment of observers on the Drina, and one of the Security Council resolutions also mentions them (No. 787 of 1992). Yet our officials have persistently claimed, and still do, that Yugoslavia has "fulfilled all the conditions" for the lifting of the sanctions!

If he managed to find the strength to support the peace plan, to sever relations with Pale, and to set up a blockade on the Drina, Milosevic should not have stopped midway. If the Security Council imposes new sanctions—just because of his rejection to allow the deployment of observers—then that will be Milosevic's worst defeat, and only then will just about everyone come down on him hard, blaming him for all and sundry.

International observers have been on our borders for a long time now (in Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia], Bulgaria, and Hungary) and no one has yet accused these countries of selling out their "state and national dignity." If at the moment the greatest Serbian interest lies in peace (and it does), if no one has the right to reject peace on the behalf of the Serbian nation (and no one has), then a few dozen observers (from countries that we ourselves choose) can only contribute to that peace, and certainly not distance or obstruct it.

It is hard to believe—although everything is possible—that this is again the case of the proverbial Serbian spite: Who will give in first—Karadzic to Milosevic and the international community, or just Milosevic to the international community? Neither of them has the right to do this. There has been more than enough of that spite, and all at the expense of innocent people.

Sacrifices are needed for the achievement of an aim. The current aim is peace. The countries of the European Union have sacrificed some of their sovereignty in order to unite. Something has to be sacrificed here. If it is a part of the state and national dignity—if that indeed is the case—have we not experienced plenty of defeats there already? Another small sacrifice for a great aim would not change a thing, but it would bring us plenty.

Police Seen as Mainstay of Government

94BA0382A Belgrade VREME in Serbo-Croatian 1 Aug 94 pp 12-15

[Article by Jovan Dulovic and Milos Vasic: "Pillar of Personal Authority"]

[Text] *The lesson of 9 March has been fully mastered: Today, the Serbian police is stronger than the military, and the current authorities rely on it exclusively, even to the extent that they allow it to beat up parliamentary deputies. What this role has meant for the police itself can be surmised from the latest scandals in the Service.*

Last week, the Serbian Parliament, the high house of elected people's representatives, had the opportunity to get to know 50 strong young people whom the authorities had sent to explain something to the opposition. Dragan Tomic, chairman of the Assembly, and Zoran Sokolovic, Serbian minister of internal affairs, explained later that these people were Assembly security officers, but the "second shift," presumably reservists. However, none of the deputies and journalists recalls ever having seen these guys in the Assembly; Toma Nikolic, leader of the Serbian Radical Party [SRS] caucus, even alleges that he recognized two of Arkan's people, with whom he fought together somewhere in Krajina. Whatever the case, behind the closed doors of the Assembly chamber these efficient young people gave a regular pummeling to several Radical people's deputies. There is television footage of this occurrence, which was unprecedented in the history of our parliamentary system, but Milorad Vucelic is allegedly keeping it under lock and key.

There is a procedural (and perhaps also a constitutional) problem here, which has been disregarded by the Assembly chairman, the government, and the president of the republic with their usual cold arrogance. Specifically, no one is supposed to enter the Assembly building armed; the police and MUP [Ministry of Internal Affairs] employees physically provide security outside the Assembly. A much more serious problem lies in a question that should be superfluous: Who is allowed to beat up people's deputies and under what conditions? Constitutional immunity—on the one hand—should protect people's deputies from any violent measures by the state, not only from punishment for parking infractions and driving "under the influence." The rules of the Service—on the other hand—control the application of

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means of force and prohibit unnecessary violence against all citizens. Admittedly, Radmilo Bogdanovic, the former, current, and lifelong member of the Service with the rank of minister (that is how he described himself in POLITIKA EKSPRES on 22 July), interprets the rules rather flexibly: "People should be beaten when they offer resistance to arrest...." However, the Radical deputies did not "offer resistance," nor were they being "arrested"; they simply refused to leave the Assembly chamber, a place where they should be inviolable. The fact that the Radicals—in the opinion of the Assembly chairman—misused the speaker's platform is a different problem and a mistake by the legislator who did not foresee this type of situation. It is also a question of a lack of principles, because these same Radicals—while they were the "most popular party"—used this same speaker's platform to freely insult and slander their political opponents, whereby no one kept them from doing so and their Socialist allies were enthusiastically behind them. The fact that the police intervened in parliament with physical force scarcely came as a surprise to anyone: The ruling coalition was completely indifferent and the opposition parties were complaining, but all they ever do is complain anyway, so what's new.... The reactions were tepid, typical for a milieu that has completely reconciled itself with governmental might instead of the rule of law. The "parliament of which Serbia will be proud" has become a parliament in which the police impose order among the people's deputies with clubs and kicks. When someday someone disperses this parliament so as not to have an intermediary between himself and the people, the people's deputies of the opposition will have no right to complain, because they have returned to the Assembly. Some of them (Mr. Milan Bozic and Mr. Zarko Korac) have joined in the analysis of the conflict between the Radicals and Socialists; some (Mr. Djindjic) have refused to "demonstrate false solidarity with the SRS"; all of them have returned, abandoning along the way their sounds of indignation. The police "reserve shift" has also returned to its brigade, and everything is just fine.

The job of the police is best described by the legal formulation: "The protection of public order and peace, the life and property of the citizens, and the constitutional order." Instead of "protecting and serving," as they nicely write on every U.S. police car, employees of internal affairs here concern themselves with other matters. We know what sort of public order and peace there is; we can see how the lives and property of the citizens are protected; and we saw in the Serbian Assembly how the constitutional order is protected. What does our police actually do?

Dragan Mladenovic, the young inspector of the Second Department of the UZSK (Administration for Combatting Crime) of the Belgrade Police, attempted to respond to that question from his perspective. The Second Department deals with robberies and thefts, and thus Mladenovic was a member of the team that worked on solving the famous theft of the vault at the famous "Jugoskandik" Bank in mid-April 1993. Perhaps the police did solve this case, but what came to court as evidence was not very convincing: The defendants were released from pretrial confinement, which led to unheard-of events. The prosecutor complained, the Supreme Court—instead of upholding or reversing the decision to release the defendants—washed its hands and sent the case back to the second panel of judges, to the astonishment of people in the judicial system, because such a thing had never happened before.

Inspector Mladenovic has his own version of this story, which largely coincides with what the panel of Judge Miroslav Todorovic found in its ruling on "Jugoskandik," but which also differs quite a bit from the usual attitude of our police in recent times—that their basic suspicion and the suspect's confession are enough for a conviction. Radmilo Bogdanovic complains that "the people are losing trust" in the police because "evidence is often lacking"; this is completely right, because part of the police's job is to secure evidence. In this case, some police officials were irritated that the court was not satisfied with the offered evidence (i.e., the absence of evidence), and so one of them threatened, in front of witnesses, to "personally liquidate the judge and wall him up like Mirza" (probably referring to Mirsad Rizvanovic, an Arkan guardist involved in the "Jugoskandik" case on various levels, who disappeared without a trace even though—as Mladenovic says—the police are looking for him among the corn; perhaps instead of him they will find Isa Lera, who is also missing, or the "certain Bosnians" who are said to have been killed). The story that Dragan Mladenovic made public is much bigger than the "Jugoskandik" affair. He described in detail a series of violations of Service rules and criminal acts committed during the investigation surrounding "Jugoskandik." People were held under house arrest for 20 days; the statements that they were to make before the examining magistrate were dictated to them; the entire atmosphere in the police—actions, procedures, security measures, and so forth—resembled a conspiracy, not crime work. He contends that two perpetrators, otherwise former policemen with a special-purpose unit, were warned to flee and that they are now in Prague, with all their money. Mladenovic talks openly about corruption, crime, and drug trafficking in the police, subjects that have been talked about quietly for years now. His public comments have provoked various commentaries, which was inevitable.

Specifically, he has escalated his confessions: He first began with the "Jugoskandik" affair, about which he said in his first interview for TELEGRAF that it was manipulated in such a way that one police faction (a Montenegrin one) tripped up another one, or rather its leader, Radovan Stojicic Badza, the deputy minister, head of the Public Security Service, and in practice the number-three man in the hierarchy (after the minister and the head of the State Security Service). In later public statements, Inspector Mladenovic broadened his charges, and the main target of the attacks was in fact

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Radovan Stojicic Badza. The attacks were bitter, and according to some policemen—aware of the position in question and who occupies it—suicidal. Radmilo Bogdanovic confirms these fears: "If that were the truth, then one of those clans in the police would not allow Mladenovic to talk—I am simplifying matters—but someone would liquidate him...." Mladenovic says that he asked Stojicic through official channels either to prohibit him from speaking or to define the limit of official secrecy up to which he can go public; he also says that Stojicic responded to him in a vulgar fashion, threatening him. Nevertheless, Mladenovic went public, even though he knew that the rules prohibit doing so without the permission of the office of the minister and outside the MUP information service. Obviously aware of the consequences, he is going for all or nothing. There are honest policemen (many more than is thought); there are also crazy policemen (many fewer than is thought); there are very few policemen with suicidal dispositions. Dragan Mladenovic is obviously an intelligent and educated young man, with a brilliant career behind him; his public statements are consistent, tasteful, and articulate. Many policemen will say privately that everything that Mladenovic is talking about is only the tip of the iceberg: that corruption in the police—with the tacit agreement of senior officials, who act as stimulus—is widespread; that violence and weapons are readily resorted to, even to the point of murder; that cooperation with organized crime is a regular phenomenon, because of the close cooperation between criminals and the authorities; that the participation by Serbian policemen in the wars in Croatia and Bosnia brought to the Service something that was not there before—the erosion of professional standards and the ready use of violence.

Radmilo Bogdanovic, who coyly says that he is a "retiree," but whose real influence in the Service certainly should not be underestimated, had various reactions to Mladenovic's statements. He first said that he does not read TELEGRAF and asked where he could buy it; he then said that he would have to see who was behind this young man; finally, he declared that these were serious matters and that someone would have to respond, expressing amazement that the figures named—the minister of internal affairs and his deputy Badza ("otherwise a wonderful specialist")—were not coming forward to respond. This development of Bogdanovic's stance indicates that something is not right here; "Cica," as the policemen call him, knows all sorts of things and talks to various people; something—obviously—has happened. Perhaps the answer lies in Mladenovic's apparently offhanded remark during an interview with Radio B-92: At that time, he casually noted that Serbian policemen are still fighting in Bosnia "in 40-day shifts," and in the context of Badza's various activities.

The war history of Radovan Stojicic Badza is known up to a point: Under various names and "legends" he was present from the very beginning in 1990 in Knin and vicinity, in Eastern Slavonia (headquarters in Borovo Selo), and in a few other locations. He was not alone, and to that extent Dragan Mladenovic's selectiveness is surprising: Anyone who mentions Badza must also mention certain other people that we will not identify here. They were on the same team and did the same things. Another related thing that is glaringly missing from Mladenovic's stories is the State Security Service of the Serbian MUP. Indeed, Dragan Mladenovic has said clearly that he will say nothing about that service. Political interpretations offered in the meantime suggest that Mladenovic's confessions could be the beginning of a "differentiation" in the Serbian police according to the line of the "war lobby" and those close to Karadzic, rather than a purge aimed at corruption. After all, no one has been bothered by corruption in the past, while malicious people say that such a large service has to be paid for, and that is expensive, so that they can do a little "self-financing," as that used to be called. In this way—the malicious people continue—the police are put into a situation of definitive dependence on their bosses: Everyone is guilty, they have everyone in their palm and can do with them whatever they want; give them any orders and dispatch them wherever. As consolation, they enjoy "the greatest criminal-law protection" through "special laws," as the experienced Belgrade judge Ilija Simic called it at a recent conference of jurists.

What "the greatest criminal-law protection" means can be seen from a few examples from police practice. Specifically, just as it is becoming increasingly dangerous for ordinary citizens to find themselves on the wrong end of a nightstick or pistol, it is also becoming increasingly safe for authorized, official figures to allow themselves to go beyond their authorities, to misuse their official position, to commit abuses in the service, and even worse things. We will leave aside the drastic and well-known cases of the Draskovic couple (2 June 1993) or the murder of the young man in the completely needless shootout on 9 March 1991; indeed, Radmilo Bogdanovic, asked about the injuries sustained by Danica and Vuk Draskovic while in detention, said: "That can be investigated, but whether the policemen will be identified if there were five or six of them involved in the arrest and melee...." A reminder: Under the law, all the participants in a bar melee will be "personally identified" without error and sentenced together if it is not determined who injured or killed whom.

For example: After the end of a bar melee between a police patrol and five local residents, some of whom were injured, near Belgrade, a policeman fired an automatic rifle at a range of 80 cm from the back of one of the participants, who was slowly moving away from the scene with a wounded leg, and killed him. The investigating team brought criminal charges against four local residents and did not even record the murder. Only when the attorney for the injured parties raised this question was an investigation carried out and the policeman was charged, but the case has been dragging on for about a year now. The policeman has not even been detained.

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For example: On 23 May 1993 at 0440 in the "Kino Klub" bar (owned by Vladetin and Knez Danilov), customers were preparing to go home. Two police vehicles (M-611-019 and M-610-952) from the Palilula OUP [Department of Internal Affairs] stopped and policemen got out with rifles and pistols drawn; they cocked their weapons and ordered the customers to line up against the wall. During the ID check, insults, punches, and comments were thrown: "You should all be at the battlefield with bullets buzzing around your butts! You are all criminals to us." The citizens put up with the blows and stayed quiet. That went on for 40 minutes, and anyone who moved got hit. The women were crying, at which a policeman mentioned the battlefield ("Cry at the battlefield!"); one policeman told one boy to get lost; when he started to do so, another one, who had heard everything, hit him. The bar owner was beaten with nightsticks. Finally, when someone asked what their crime was, a policeman said "you were in the wrong place at the wrong time. Now, get lost and watch out from now on." He did not say watch out for what. At the No. 10 Police Station (Palilula), the injured parties filed a complaint and were told that these are gangs in police uniforms that rob people; the vehicles in question were outside the window, and the policemen who had beaten them were hanging around in the corridors. The assistant to the commander said that he did not recommend bringing criminal charges because the punishment—in the worst case (for the policemen)—is insignificant. Later he threatened them and told them to leave him alone. Criminal charges were brought, but with no results.

Federal Minister of Justice Zoran Stojanovic complained in early June that minor criminal acts are pursued while serious ones are not. Last year, 180,000 criminal acts were reported (359 murders, 100 grand larcenies, 1,900 armed robberies), and the growth rate is 90-100 percent. Criminologists have warned that the statistics are unreliable (somehow it turns out that there is less crime now than in 1985); that the number of criminal acts is increasing while the prisons are empty, which indicates that the police is not doing its job; that good professionals have left the police and judiciary, to be replaced by suitable patriots. During that time, officials with the ruling party have tirelessly repeated phrases about the "battle against crime"; in addition, there is a discernable attempt to make the courts identical to the police and to put those tedious attorneys out of action. Thus, Radmilo Bogdanovic complains that "attorneys can drag things out for months... so that the people lose confidence"; then he said that if 700,000 German marks was found on former Minister Velimir Mihajlovic, he "must be convicted. He could not have saved or earned that. He is obviously guilty. A verdict should have been handed down by now." At the same time, Mr. Bogdanovic did not ask where a certain pastry shop owner from Belgrade, with whom he in fact regularly exchanges kisses at soccer matches, got the money for an enormous house and various businesses, even though there is well-founded suspicion in that regard.

The Serbian police have something like 80,000 (regular) members and many more if the reserves are raised. Judging from their privileges, arrogance, and strength, they are the mainstay of the regime. Some say that they share that role with television, but television cannot protect the regime from some things that the police can (by disciplining people's deputies, for example). It is possible to understand the nervousness that forced the regime to make the Serbian police what it has made it; however, it is not possible to understand the fact that the police is professionally ruined, that the rules of the game have been lost, and that the difference between right and wrong has disappeared entirely. In the long run—and the police should serve any government, including future ones—the damage is enormous.

Organized Crime, Violence Rising in Belgrade

94BA0379A Ljubljana SLOVENEC in Slovene 14 Jul 94 p 5

[Article by Kaca Mijanovic: "Wave of Violence in Belgrade"]

[Text] Violence in Belgrade has been growing year by year, but especially in the last few months. There has also been a growth in the number of dead and wounded, attacked in broad daylight in the center of the city. Inns and bars are blown up, bombs are fired at cars, and even discotheques are destroyed.

In May and June, experts say, a war was started by rich men who loaned money to numerous owners and came to collect the debts. For this purpose they usually hire specialized agencies that actually hide under the auspices of several enterprises; they are even prepared to kill the debtors if they cannot repay the debt. They usually hire paid murderers from the ranks of the international mafia for this purpose.

The link between the domestic and international mafias is most obvious in the smuggling of stolen automobiles. Since the beginning of the war on the territory of the former Yugoslavia, Belgrade has become a transit center for the distribution of stolen automobiles from Western Europe to Russia and the Middle East. They obtain them through Italy, Slovenia, Croatia, and Hungary. In a country that is under international measures and under the supervision of numerous UNPROFOR [UN Protection Forces] observers and is likewise prohibited from importing foreign products except for those approved by special committees of the UN Security Council, only the Serbia mafia is not feeling the effects of the blockade. Trailer-loads of cars and Mercedes convoys are arriving in Belgrade, and—as recently revealed—the UNPROFOR mafia is responsible for this. It is the only one that can stop any convoy or allow it to continue on—for a certain price, of course. Thus, for example, at the Romanian-Yugoslav border near Prahovo, three Dutchmen are prepared to "wink an eye" for 500,000 German marks [DM], and the situation at all the border crossings is the same.

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The Belgrade mafia market itself is strictly divided among the Serbian, Albanian, and Gypsy mafias. Casual bystanders are also frequent victims of their clashes. It is known that the Gypsy mafia imports goods for the Yugoslav black market through the so-called Kusturica route (from Trieste to Belgrade). The Gypsy mafia also smuggles children along that route, usually ones from Kosovo, and then sells them in Europe for approximately DM8,000.

Foreign middlemen are sometimes also involved in the clashes among mafia groups; through various "phantom" representations in Yugoslavia, they collect at any price the real or invented foreign debts of Yugoslav citizens, usually successful businessmen. The thieves and brigands have also been joined by a new type of urban criminals, who, in false uniforms and with false documents, represent themselves as the "monetary" police.

The closeness of the war has also brought to the foreground the issue of the misuse of weapons, ammunition, and explosives. A few days ago the Interior Ministry published the fact that in the last two years, 20,000 individuals have been charged and 21,000 firearms have been confiscated (including 106 machine guns, 2,000 automatic rifles, 10,000 pistols, more than 5,000 hand grenades, and so forth).

Criminologist Dr. Vladan Vasiljevic says that there is no organized mafia in the country, but several phenomena hint at this. The above-mentioned expert thinks that in large urban centers from 10 to 15 percent of the able-bodied population is involved in mafia business, and people from illegally organized state and private enterprises are also involved in criminal actions.

Experts are publicly discussing whether a special committee should be established in the federal parliament to combat organized crime. Some are in favor, but others are afraid that such a committee might grow into a new secret police with great powers. All of them agree, however, that the existing official authorities should work better, since the underground is obviously working splendidly.

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